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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—CROSS-GENDER  PAT  SEARCHES: 
THE BATTLE BETWEEN INMATES AND CORRECTIONS OFFICERS EN­
TERS THE COURTROOM 
INTRODUCTION 
These pat-downs were delivered by both male and female 
guards and ran the gamut from perfunctory to full-out inappro­
priate. 
Most of the male guards made a great show of performing the 
absolute minimal frisk necessary, skimming their fingertips along 
your arms, legs, and waist in such a way that said “Not touching! 
Not touching! Not really touching!”  They didn’t want any sug­
gestion of impropriety raised against them.  But a handful of the 
male guards apparently felt no fear about grabbing whatever 
they wanted.  They were allowed to touch the lower edge of our 
bras, to make sure we weren’t smuggling goodies in there—but 
were they really allowed to squeeze our breasts? . . .  Other male 
COs were brazen, like the short, red-faced young bigmouth who 
asked me loudly and repeatedly, “Where are the weapons of 
mass destruction?” while he fondled my ass and I gritted my 
teeth.1 
Society is constantly evolving, adapting to the standards and 
sensitivities of the current population. This evolution has been 
marked with a number of great strides, many of which we take for 
granted today.  Women, for instance, assume they will not be dis­
criminated against in employment decisions; not too long ago that 
right would have appeared anything but certain.2  Prisoners’ rights 
have also changed substantially since the days when the prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishment was understood solely as a prohi­
bition on barbarous methods of punishment.3  Unfortunately, as so­
cietal standards evolve, there are conflicts. This Note addresses one 
such conflict: the use of cross-gender pat searches in United States 
prisons pits prisoners’ rights—including constitutional rights such as 
1. PIPER  KERMAN, ORANGE IS THE  NEW  BLACK: MY  YEAR IN A  WOMEN’S 
PRISON 236 (2010). 
2. See infra notes 137-180 and accompanying text detailing the fight of female R 
guards in gaining access to careers in corrections, including the effect of Title VII in 
making corrections careers available to women. 
3. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). 
567 
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the right to privacy, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, 
and others—against the right of employees to be free from gender-
based discrimination as guaranteed by Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.4 
A pat search, sometimes referred to as a pat frisk, is a clothed 
body search in which a correctional officer feels a prisoner’s clothed 
body.5  Pat searches are an integral component of prison security, 
allowing the prison to detect and control contraband.6  One prison 
training manual, describing a pat search of a female inmate, in­
structed a guard 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).  While this Note discusses the issue in terms of 
cross-gender pat searches, the conflict itself is not so limited. This conflict will arise 
wherever prisoner privacy rights are at odds with employment determinations. 
The modern sensitivity to the significance of gender in American life and law 
has made it inevitable that cases will arise where gender-based legal conten­
tions conflict.  This case arises in a context where that conflict can be expected 
to recur with some frequency: privacy rights versus employment rights.  Mem­
bers of one sex assert a privacy right not to have their unclothed bodies viewed 
by members of the opposite sex.  At the same time, members of one sex assert 
an employment right not to be discriminated against in job opportunities be­
cause of their gender. 
Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1211-12 (2d Cir. 1980). 
5. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  JUSTICE  FEDERAL  BUREAU OF  PRISONS, PROGRAM 
STATEMENT  NUMBER 5521.05, SEARCHES OF  HOUSING  UNITS, INMATES, AND  INMATE 
WORK AREAS § 552.11(a), at 2 (1997); see STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF COR­
RECTIONAL  SERVICES, DIRECTIVE  NO. 4910, CONTROL OF & SEARCH FOR  CONTRA­
BAND § III(B)(1), at 2 (2001) (describing a “pat frisk” as “a search by hand of an 
inmate’s person and his or her clothes while the inmate is clothed, except that the in­
mate shall be required to remove coat, hat, and shoes”). 
6. Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 1990) (“It is undisputed that pat 
searches, both on a routine basis and prior to unannounced ‘cell shakedowns,’ are es­
sential to maintaining proper prison security.”); Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 960 
(7th Cir. 1983).  While an argument may be made that pat searches are of decreasing 
importance as new technologies in security take their place, this argument is non-essen­
tial to the conclusion reached in this Note; as such the author has chosen to concede the 
importance of pat-searches throughout. 
The Federal Bureau of Prisons divides contraband into two categories, hard contra­
band and nuisance contraband. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
PRISONS, PROGRAM  STATEMENT  NUMBER 5580.07, PERSONAL  PROPERTY, INMATE 
§ 553.12[b], at 10 (2005).  “[H]ard contraband [is] any item which poses a serious threat 
to the security of an institution[,] . . .  includ[ing] weapons, intoxicants, and currency 
(where prohibited).” Id.  “[N]uisance contraband” is anything not hard contraband, 
which is not currently authorized or which posses “a threat to security or its condition 
or excessive quantities of it present a health, fire, or housekeeping hazard.” Id. at 11. 
Examples of nuisance contraband include “excessive accumulation of commissary, 
newspapers, letters, or magazines which cannot be stored neatly and safely in the desig­
nated area; [as well as] food items which are spoiled or retained beyond the point of 
safe consumption.” Id. 
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to “[u]se a flat hand and pushing motion across the [inmate’s] 
crotch area.”  The guard must “[p]ush inward and upward when 
searching the crotch and upper thighs of the inmate.”  All seams 
in the leg and the crotch area are to be “squeez[ed] and 
knead[ed].”  Using the back of the hand, the guard also is to 
search the breast area in a sweeping motion, so that the breasts 
will be “flattened.”7 
A cross-gender pat search is, as the name implies, a pat search 
performed by a prison staff member of the opposite sex.8  Because 
of the inherently personal nature of having a member of the oppo­
site sex feeling a prisoners’ body, numerous challenges have arisen 
to this practice within the last few decades.9 
In June 2009, the National Prison Rape Elimination Act 
(PREA) Commission brought this issue to the forefront with the 
issuance of proposed standards meant to eliminate rape and sexual 
abuse in prisons.10  The Commission, recognizing the increased op­
7. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1993) (alterations in original) 
(citations omitted). 
8. Brenda V. Smith, Watching You, Watching Me, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 225, 
229, 259-62 (2003).  A 2001 Federal Bureau of Prisons training video instructs officers 
on how to perform cross-gender pat searches. DVD: Federal Bureau of Prisons 
Presents Pat Search Procedures (Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Prisons 
2001) (on file with author).  First the video depicts a male officer searching a female 
inmate. Id.  To search the inmate’s breast area, the officer stands at her side. Id.  With 
one hand guarding his crotch area, the officer places his other hand vertically along the 
inmate’s breast bone with the back of his hand facing towards her breast. Id.  He then 
runs his hand down circling under the breast and upwards towards the armpit area 
applying sufficient “pressure to detect any contraband.” Id.  To search the groin area 
the officer stands to the side of the inmate, and, with her arm raised, he places his “palm 
flat on the lower abdomen with the fingers aligned with the zipper.” Id.  The officer’s 
other hand is placed flat, palm facing inwards, “below the waistband on the buttocks.” 
Id.  In a continuous, circular sweeping motion the officer “run[s] both hands from the 
starting point to the ankle area, “with special” attention paid to “seams, waistbands, 
zippers and buttons.” Id. 
A cross-gender pat search of a man is done principally while standing facing the 
inmates back with his arms raised. Id.  The corrections officer searches the chest and 
abdomen areas by standing behind the inmate and reaching her arms around and feel­
ing down his front. Id.  To further search the lower abdomen, groin, and shoe areas, the 
officer moves to a position “slightly to the side [and rear] of the inmate.” Id.  The 
officer places her “palm flat, . . . one hand directly below the waistband with fingers 
aligned with the zipper [and] [t]he other hand, palm flat, directly below the waistband 
on the buttocks.” Id.  She then uses a continuous circular sweeping motion down to the 
foot, “pay[ing] special attention to the inmate’s lower abdomen and groin.” Id. 
9. Smith, supra note 8, at 259-62. R 
10. NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM., REPORT 1 (June 2009) [here­
inafter PREA REPORT].  The Commission was formed as a result of the Prison Rape 
Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. § 15606 (2006).  “The Commission . . . carr[ied] out a 
comprehensive legal and factual study of the penalogical, physical, mental, medical, so­
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portunity for sexual assault during cross-gender supervision, called 
for the cessation of non-emergency cross-gender pat searches.11 
The PREA Commission’s proposed standards went to the Attorney 
General for consideration in enacting final Prison Rape Elimination 
Act standards.12 
The PREA Commission is not the only group to recognize a 
need for change in this area. The American Bar Association 
(ABA) recently adopted a new edition of its Standards on the 
Treatment of Prisoners.13  One new standard limits cross-gender pat 
searches to emergency situations.14  In a memorandum to the ABA 
Criminal Justice Council and interested parties explaining the ratio­
nale for the proposed (now adopted) changes, Professor Margo 
Schlanger noted that “cross-gender searches have grave implica­
tions for the privacy interests of prisoners, and allow access to pris­
oners’ bodies in ways that can be abused.”15 
On February 3, 2011, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
promulgated its own set of proposed Prison Rape Elimination Act 
standards.16  The DOJ standard on cross-gender supervision allows 
cial, and economic impacts of prison rape in the United States.” Id. § 15606(d)(1). 
Based on its findings, the Commission released a report with “recommended national 
standards for reducing prison rape”; “recommended protocols for preserving evidence 
and treating victims of prison rape; and” a “summary of all materials relied on by the 
Commission” when preparing its report. Id. § 15606(d)(3)(B). 
11. PREA REPORT, supra note 10, at 62-63.  “Except in the case of emergency or R 
other extraordinary or unforeseen circumstances, the facility restricts nonmedical staff 
from viewing inmates of the opposite gender who are nude or performing bodily func­
tions and similarly restricts cross-gender pat-down searches.” NATIONAL PRISON RAPE 
ELIMINATION COMM., STANDARDS FOR THE PREVENTION, DETECTION, RESPONSE, AND 
MONITORING OF SEXUAL ABUSE IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS PP-4, at 11 (June 2009). 
12. National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 6,248, 6,249 (proposed Feb. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt 115) (“Pursuant 
to PREA, the final rule adopting national standards ‘shall be based upon the indepen­
dent judgment of the Attorney General, after giving due consideration to the recom­
mended national standards provided by the Commission.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. at 
15607(a)(2))). 
13. ABA STANDARDS FOR  CRIMINAL  JUSTICE (THIRD) TREATMENT OF  PRISON­
ERS (2010), http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/treatmentprisoners.html. 
14. Id. at #23-7.9(b) (“Except in exigent situations, a search of a prisoner’s body, 
including a pat-down search or a visual search of the prisoner’s private bodily areas, 
should be conducted by correctional staff of the same gender as the prisoner.”). 
15. Memorandum from Margo Schlanger, Rep., Task Force on Treatment of Pris­
oners, to American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section 28 (June 12, 2009) (on file 
with author).  Professor Schlanger also noted that “[t]he PREA Commission invested 
substantial time into documenting the resulting problems, and developing solutions. 
This proposed Standard matches the pending PREA standards on this point.” Id. 
16. National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 6,248.  Upon receipt of the PREA Commission’s proposed standards “[t]he 
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cross-gender pat searches in most circumstances.17  In justifying its 
decision not to adopt the PREA Commission’s proposal prohibiting 
cross-gender pat searches the DOJ expressed “concern[ ] about the 
high cost of imposing such a general requirement, and the concomi­
tant effect on employment opportunities for women.”18  Further­
more, it noted that “many agencies expressed concern that the 
necessary adjustments to their workforce could violate Federal or 
State equal employment laws.”19  The commentary period on the 
DOJ standards will end in early April, at which time further revi­
sions may be made before a final set of standards become law for 
detention facilities around the country.20 
In light of the determination by influential groups, including 
the PREA Commission21 and the ABA,22 that cross-gender pat 
searches be limited to emergency circumstances, why has this policy 
not been abolished?  As the DOJ’s proposed Prison Rape Elimina­
tion Act standards reflect, the answer lies largely in the effect a 
prohibition could have on prison employment practices, particularly 
for women working in men’s prisons.23  Pat searches are a principle 
Attorney General established a PREA Working Group, chaired by the Office of the 
Deputy Attorney General, to review each of the Commission’s proposed standards and 
to help him prepare a draft final rule.” Id. at 6,249. 
17. See id. at 6278.  There is an exemption available, however, for those inmates 
who can show that they have suffered from prior cross-gender sexual victimization 
while incarcerated. Id. (“[T]he agency shall implement procedures to exempt from 
non-emergency cross-gender pat-down searches those inmates who have suffered docu­
mented prior cross-gender sexual abuse while incarcerated.”). The proposed standards 
also provide that an “agency shall train security staff in how to conduct cross-gender 
pat-down searches . . . in a professional and respectful manner, and in the least intrusive 
manner possible, consistent with security needs.” Id.  As will be discussed in greater 
detail later in this note, neither of these provisions are sufficient to address the numer­
ous concerns resulting from cross-gender pat searches. See supra notes 85-94 (discuss- R 
ing a case where the Ninth Circuit found a violation of the Eighth Amendment because 
of the effects cross-gender pat searches can have on women who were sexually victim­
ized prior to incarceration); supra note 275 (discussing why cross-gender pat searches R 
can lead to Constitutional violations even when performed professionally). 
18. National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 6,253. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 6248.  Final standards adopted by the Attorney General will be promul­
gated to the states within ninety days of publication and will be immediately applicable 
to the Federal Bureau of Prisons.  42 U.S.C. § 15607 (2006).  Any state that does not 
comply with the final national standards risks will have its federal funding cut by 5%. 
Id. § 15607(c)(2). 
21. Supra note 11 and accompanying text. R 
22. Supra notes 15-17. R 
23. Supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text; see Rebecca Jurado, The Essence R 
of Her Womanhood: Defining The Privacy Rights of Women Prisoners and the Employ­
ment Rights of Women Guards, 7 AM. U.J. GENDER  SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 39 (1999) 
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means of detecting contraband.24  Disallowing cross-gender pat 
searches would arguably prevent guards of one gender from effec­
tively performing their job.  “If a state is required to hire women as 
guards in its male prisons, it reasonably seems to follow that it must 
be allowed to utilize female guards to the fullest extent possible.”25 
This Note considers the conflicting interests presented by pris­
oners in not being subjected to cross-gender pat searches and by 
corrections officers in not being discriminated against in employ­
ment opportunities.  Ultimately, this Note argues that an inmate’s 
rights, including Constitutional rights under the Fourth and Eighth 
Amendments, take precedence, and therefore, cross-gender pat 
searches should only be performed during emergencies. There are 
solutions, however, that respect inmate rights while preserving em­
ployment opportunities for both male and female correctional staff. 
To the extent possible, these solutions must be pursued prior to im­
plementation of a bona fide occupational qualification, thereby pre­
serving the rights of both prisoners and corrections officers. 
In Part I, this Note discusses various prisoners’ rights impli­
cated by the use of cross-gender pat searches.  In Part II, this Note 
turns to the rights of corrections officers in light of Title VII.  Part 
III examines the conflicting rights and reaches the conclusion that 
inmate rights take precedence, and therefore, non-emergency cross-
gender pat searches should be prohibited. Finally, Part IV analyzes 
the viability of prior solutions and briefly suggests various policies 
that may be implemented, given a prohibition on non-emergency 
cross-gender pat searches, to protect employment opportunities. 
(“When male prisoners have asserted their right to bodily privacy, the rights of the male 
prisoners have lost to the employment rights of female guards.”); Teresa A. Miller, 
Keeping the Government’s Hands Off Our Bodies: Mapping a Feminist Legal Theory 
Approach to Privacy in Cross-Gender Prison Searches, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 861, 880­
81 (2001) (“In balancing the penological objectives of prison officials against the privacy 
interest of prisoners, courts have generally held that the expectation of privacy for male 
prisoners is low and that the penological objective of eliminating discrimination against 
women in staff pursuant to Title VII mandate is high.”). 
24. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM 
STATEMENT 5500.12 CORRECTIONAL  SERVICES  PROCEDURES  MANUAL § 208(3), at 10 
(2003); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  JUSTICE  FEDERAL  BUREAU OF  PRISONS, PROGRAM 
STATEMENT 5521.05 SEARCHES OF HOUSING UNITS, INMATES, AND INMATE WORK AR­
EAS § 552.11(a), at 2 (1997) (stating that “[s]taff may conduct a pat search of an inmate 
on a routine or random basis to control contraband”); cf. id. § 552.11(b), at 3 (requiring 
a reasonable belief of contraband, or a good opportunity to conceal contraband before 
performing a visual (strip) search). 
25. Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 54 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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I. PRISONERS: WHAT’S THE BIG  DEAL? 
Cross-gender pat searches have been subjected to challenges 
by prisoners on a number of grounds, many of which involve rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.  “Prison walls 
do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protec­
tions of the Constitution.”26  As a result, “ ‘[w]hen a prison regula­
tion or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, 
federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional 
rights.’”27  Inmate claims are not limited to constitutional rights, 
however.  These claims may be based on federal statutes or state 
constitutions.  Prohibiting cross-gender pat searches may also be 
justified based on a desire to avoid sexual assault by prison staff. 
A.	 Constitutional Claims Subject to the Turner v. Safley 
Reasonableness Test 
Constitutional claims brought by prisoners can be divided into 
two categories.  The first category, including the majority of consti­
tutional claims, are those claims that are subject to a four-factor 
“reasonableness” test set forth by the Supreme Court in Turner v. 
Safley.28 
In Turner, the Court struck the Eighth Circuit’s use of a strict 
scrutiny standard in examining inmate constitutional rights.29  The 
Court held that the use of a strict scrutiny test “would seriously 
hamper the [prison administration’s] ability to anticipate security 
problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable 
problems” facing them.30 
Instead, the Court applied an analysis that determines whether 
a prison regulation “is reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests.”31  In evaluating the reasonableness of a prison regula­
tion, the Court established a four-factor balancing test: (1) whether 
26. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). A prisoner retains, for instance, the 
right to be free from discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. 
27. Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974)). 
28. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1530 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that 
the Supreme Court has applied the standard in Turner to “‘all circumstances in which 
the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights’” (quoting Washing­
ton v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990))). This four-factor test will heretofore be re­
ferred to as the “Turner test.” 
29. Turner, 482 U.S. at 81.  In Turner, inmates challenged the constitutionality of 
two prison practices: one limiting the ability of inmates to send mail to inmates in other 
institutions, and the other limiting the ability of two inmates to marry. Id. 
30. Id. at 89. 
31. Id. 
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there is “a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regula­
tion and the legitimate governmental interest”; (2) “whether there 
are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to 
prison inmates”; (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted 
constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on 
the allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4) the existence 
of any “ready alternatives” as an indicator of the reasonableness of 
the regulation.32 
1. First Amendment Challenges 
The First Amendment of the Constitution guarantees, among 
other rights, the free exercise of religion.33  The First Amendment 
limits not only those burdens imposed by the federal government, 
but also those imposed by the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.34  As a result, “reasonable opportunities must be af­
forded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”35  In fact, religion is 
often encouraged for prisoners because of its potential rehabilita­
tive effects.36 
Because of the importance that Congress placed on religion for 
inmates, it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA), and later, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (RLUIPA).37  These federal statutes require the gov­
ernment to meet a much higher compelling government interest 
standard as opposed to the Turner reasonableness standard when 
enacting policies that infringe on an inmate’s religious freedoms.38 
As a result, those inmates who have a First Amendment claim 
would do better to bring a claim under either RFRA or RLUIPA. 
Since courts do not decide a constitutional issue when a case can be 
32. Id. at 89-90. 
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
34. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb-1, as recognized in Allah v. Menei, 84 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
35. Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Cruz, 405 U.S. 
at 322 n.2) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
36. See Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitu­
tionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 510-11 
(2005) (citing hearing testimony that “[r]eligious observance by prisoners . . . cut recidi­
vism rates by two-thirds”). See generally Cruz, 405 U.S. at 319-20 (noting that the 
prison in question encouraged participation in certain religions, even awarding points of 
good merit to prisoners who attended religious services). 
37. See infra notes 107-128 and accompanying text for a discussion of religious R 
challenges to cross-gender pat searches under RFRA and RLUIPA. 
38. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. R 
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decided on a statutory basis,39 while an inmate may have a claim 
that cross-gender pat searches violate his or her First Amendment 
rights, this issue is unlikely to be decided—making religiously based 
First Amendment challenges to cross-gender pat searches a largely 
academic matter.40 
2. Fourth Amendment Challenges 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro­
tects citizens from “unreasonable searches and seizures,”41 making 
it an obvious choice for those inmates looking to challenge cross-
gender pat searches.42  These claims also offer the clearest legiti­
39. Forde v. Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170, 182 (D. Conn. 2010) (“Because courts 
generally do not reach constitutional issues if a case can be resolved on statutory 
grounds, and because the Court finds a violation of RFRA, it need not reach the consti­
tutional question of whether FCI Danbury’s policy violates the First Amendment.”). 
Conversely, if the court did not find a violation of RFRA, using a compelling govern­
ment interest test, it would not have found a violation of the Turner reasonableness 
standard under the First Amendment either. 
40. This statement should not be read to suggest, however, that cross-gender pat 
searches do not violate the First Amendment.  Rather, all that is meant is that the 
courts are unlikely to decide this issue while RFRA and RLUIPA are ready 
alternatives. 
In a Connecticut District Court summary judgment decision, regarding whether 
cross-gender pat searches violated a Muslim inmate’s religious freedoms under both 
RFRA and the First Amendment, the district court did not grant summary judgment on 
the First Amendment issue.  Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F. Supp. 2d 171, 180-81 (D. Conn. 
2009).  Instead, the district court found that there were remaining issues of material fact 
regarding whether a rational relationship existed between the asserted penological in­
terests of security and employment and cross-gender pat searches. Id.  The court found 
compelling that FCI Danbury had provided a blanket exemption to cross-gender pat 
searches in the past “with little or no impact on employment.” Id.  The court further 
stated that FCI Danbury had “provided no evidence that exempting even the small 
group of other observant Muslim women would disrupt prison policy.” Id.  Finally, 
there had been no evidence produced to show that other Muslim women had the same 
sincerely held religious belief against cross-gender pat searches, and therefore there had 
been no basis for a finding that exempting Ms. Forde would have a widespread effect on 
prison security. Id.  Because of the remaining factual uncertainties, the court held that 
FCI Danbury had “not adequately demonstrated that the challenged practice furthers a 
legitimate penological objective.” Id. 
41. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
42. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1541 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., 
concurring) (stating that, in his opinion, the Fourth Amendment was the appropriate 
basis on which to decide the case because “[t]here can be no doubt that the question 
whether the particular type of search involved here is constitutional implicates the 
fourth amendment”); Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 53 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding that a 
constitutional protection from cross-gender pat searches “would likely be found, if at 
all, in the Fourth Amendment guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches or the 
more general right of personal privacy which has been recognized as implicit in that 
Amendment”). 
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mate penological interest for prisons, however, because of the nec­
essary relinquishment of certain privacy rights by inmates upon 
entering incarceration.43  The determination of whether a cross-
gender pat search violates an inmate’s Fourth Amendment right to 
privacy can turn on factors including the scope of the pat search44 
and the gender of the inmate.45 
In Timm v. Gunter, the Eighth Circuit applied the Turner test 
to a claim by male inmates that cross-gender pat searches violated 
their Fourth Amendment right to privacy.46  The prison asserted a 
legitimate penological interest in fulfilling the requirements of Title 
VII.47  The court stated that “[t]he administrators at [the Nebraska 
State Penitentiary] must weigh the rights of the prisoners, the equal 
employment rights of both the female guards and the male guards, 
and the institutional need for internal security.”48 
While pat searches are necessary in maintaining prison secur­
ity,49 the appropriate question is whether a pat search performed by 
a member of the opposite sex is unreasonable.50  The Eighth Circuit 
found probative that all employees “are trained to perform pat 
searches in a professional manner,” and that most inmates do not 
object to cross-gender pat searches.51  Based on these factors, the 
court concluded that the privacy rights of some inmates “must give 
43. Smith, 678 F.2d at 54 (referring to privacy rights as “[o]ne of the most impor­
tant rights which is necessarily limited as a result of one’s incarceration”). 
44. See generally Smith, 678 F.2d 52.  In Smith a male inmate claimed that being 
forced to submit to cross-gender pat searches violated his constitutional rights. Id. at 
53.  The Seventh Circuit recognized that submitting to a pat search can “be a humiliat­
ing and degrading experience” and that having it performed by a member of the oppo­
site sex could exacerbate the feelings of degradation. Id.  The court further recognized 
that despite “the right of one sex not to be discriminated against in job opportunities 
within the prison because of their gender . . . inmates do have some right to avoid 
unwanted intrusions by persons of the opposite sex.” Id. at 55.  The Seventh Circuit 
held, however, that Smith’s right to privacy had not been violated because the pat 
searches in question did not involve the anal or genital areas. Id.  In reaching its con­
clusion, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Smith from Sterling v. Cupp, where an inmate 
had successfully argued that cross-gender pat searches involving the genitalia violated 
his rights under the Oregon State Constitution. Id. at 55; see Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 
123, 126 (Or. 1981). 
45. See infra notes 46-67 and accompanying text, examining both a male inmate’s R 
Fourth Amendment claim and a female inmate’s Fourth Amendment claim. 
46. Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 1990). 
47. Id. at 1098. 
48. Id. at 1099. 
49. See supra note 6. R 
50. Timm, 917 F.2d at 1100.  The fact that pat searches are important does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that cross-gender pat searches are also necessary. See 
infra notes 117-118 and accompanying text. R 
51. Timm, 917 F.2d at 1100. 
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way to the use of [cross-gender] pat searches” because the prison’s 
interests in equal employment rights and security are more 
important.52 
The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that there is not an alterna­
tive way for prisoners to practice their constitutional privacy 
rights.53  The court found that accommodation of the rights would 
have more than a de minimis effect on prison resources, and would 
be a great burden on both the guards and on prison resources as a 
whole.54  The court concluded that a prison administrator could 
choose to accommodate an inmate’s request for privacy, but that 
there is no constitutional requirement that he do so.55 
A different conclusion entirely was reached in Colman v. Vas­
quez, a suit involving a female inmate’s claim that cross-gender pat 
searches violated her Fourth Amendment privacy rights.56  Ms. Col-
man was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) 
in Danbury, where she was placed in a special unit for victims of 
sexual assault.57  While in the sexual trauma unit she was forced to 
submit to pat searches by male guards.58  During one pat search, 
Ms. Colman alleged that Corrections Officer Vasquez made inap­
propriate advances of a sexual nature.59  Despite the fact that Ms. 
Colman alerted several FCI Danbury staff to the inappropriate be­
havior, the harassment continued for several months, ending in 
March of 1997 with a physical assault.60 
Ms. Colman brought suit alleging that the cross-gender pat 
searches violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from un­
reasonable searches.61  The United States District Court of Con­
necticut stated that Ms. Colman retained “some limited Fourth 
Amendment right to bodily privacy.”62  The Connecticut District 
Court distinguished Ms. Colman’s case from prior cross-gender pat 
search cases on two grounds: first, the court noted that none of the 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id.  For a further discussion on the role of prison administrators’ discretion in 
balancing these competing interests, see infra notes 285-299 and accompanying text. R 
56. Colman v. Vasquez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 226 (D. Conn. 2001). 
57. Id. at 229. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 230.  Ms. Colman also alleged a violation of her Eighth Amendment 
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, violation of the Violence Against 
Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, and various state tort claims. Id. at 228-30. 
62. Id. at 231. 
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other cases had been decided solely on the pleadings; second, and 
more importantly, the court distinguished this case because it in­
volved a female inmate who had been placed in a special unit for 
victims of sexual trauma.63 
Female inmates’ privacy rights have been viewed by a number 
of courts as being “qualitatively different than the same rights as­
serted by male inmates.”64  In Colman, the Connecticut District 
Court found that the genders of Ms. Colman and Corrections Of­
ficer Vasquez were relevant to determining whether Ms. Colman’s 
privacy rights had been violated.65  The court justified a gender-
based determination because “‘women experience unwanted inti­
mate touching by men differently from men subject to comparable 
touching by women.’”66  The court ruled that judgment should not 
be granted on the pleadings because to do so “would require a find­
ing that all types of pat searches are generically lawful, without in­
quiry into the nature of the search, the circumstances of the 
inmates, or the penological justifications for the particular policy at 
issue.”67 
3. Fourteenth Amendment Challenges 
Many states have already decided not to use cross-gender pat 
searches in female institutions.68  Part of the rationale behind this 
decision may be the perception that men and women experience 
unwanted touching differently.69  Distinguishing between male and 
female inmates based on gender alone serves as the basis for a 
claim of discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.70 
In Madyun v. Franzen, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that 
the Department of Corrections treated inmates differently based on 
gender,71 subjecting male inmates to cross-gender pat searches, but 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 232. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. (quoting Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
67. Id. at 232. 
68. See infra Table 1.  Three states and the District of Columbia prohibit cross-
gender pat searches in female institutions, another twenty-five states allow cross-gender 
pat searches of female inmates only in emergency circumstances. See infra Table 1. 
69. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. R 
70. See Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 962 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that any gender-based distinction drawn by the state ‘must serve 
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of 
those objectives.’” (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976))). 
71. Id. at 962. 
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exempting female inmates.72  The Seventh Circuit held, however, 
that “the state’s justification for the disparity is as manifest as the 
disparity in treatment itself.”73 
The justification the Seventh Circuit found compelling was not 
based on the gender of the inmate, but rather, was based on the 
gender of the corrections officer.74  The Seventh Circuit held that 
the gender distinction served an important role in equalizing job 
opportunities for women in corrections.75  It would not have been 
feasible for the prison to hire women if they could not perform pat 
searches; therefore, cross-gender pat searching male inmates pro­
tects female employment opportunities.76  There was no need for a 
similar pat search policy for female inmates as there had been “no 
indication that males have suffered a lack of opportunity to serve as 
prison guards because they are precluded from frisk searching fe­
male inmates.”77 
B.	 Constitutional Claims Not Subject to Turner v. Safley–The 
Eighth Amendment 
The Supreme Court has stated that the Turner test, which pro­
vides a deferential level of review to actions by prison administra­
tors,78 is applicable whenever “the needs of prison administration 
implicate constitutional rights.”79  The Ninth Circuit has held, how­
ever, that the Turner test was meant only to apply to those rights 
that are shared by all citizens, inmates, and non-inmates alike, and 
not to Eighth Amendment claims.80  The decision in Turner in­
volved rights that “may necessarily be limited due to the unique 
circumstances of imprisonment.”81  The Eighth Amendment is 
unique in that it “do[es] not conflict with incarceration”; instead it 
applies only to incarcerated persons, ensuring that they are not sub­
72.	 Id. 
73.	 Id. 
74.	 Id. 
75.	 Id. 
76.	 Id. 
77.	 Id. 
78.	 See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. R 
79.	 Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1530 (9th Cir. 1993). 
80.	 Id. 
81. Id.  An example is where constitutional rights to privacy are asserted. Id. 
There is a “legitimate [and necessary] penological interest[ ]” in monitoring inmates, 
therefore privacy is a right that necessarily conflicts with the unique circumstances of 
imprisonment. Id. at 1530, 1535; see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1979) (up­
holding cell shake-down and visual body cavity searches as not violating constitutional 
rights to privacy because maintaining institutional security is an essential goal). 
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jected to “cruel and unusual punishments.”82  To show a violation 
of the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must establish that “there is 
an infliction of pain, and . . . that [the] infliction [of pain] is unneces­
sary and wanton.”83 
Jordan v. Gardner is one of the most startling examples of an 
Eighth Amendment claim resulting from cross-gender pat 
searches.84 Jordan involved an all-female institution where approx­
imately 85% of the inmates reported a history of sexual assault to 
prison counselors “including rapes, molestations, beatings, and slav­
ery.”85  In 1989, a new superintendent instituted cross-gender pat 
searches for two reasons: to improve prison security, and to avoid 
“an eventual lawsuit by the female guards.”86  Prior to implementa­
tion of the cross-gender pat searches, prison psychologists warned 
the superintendent that these “searches could cause severe emo­
tional distress in some inmates”; despite the warnings, the policy 
was implemented on July 5, 1989.87 
The policy remained in effect for only one day because of the 
extreme reactions of some inmates.88  One inmate “had to have her 
fingers pried loose from bars she had grabbed during the search, 
and she vomited after returning to her cell block.”89  In issuing a 
permanent injunction against these searches, the district court had 
over 1,000 pages of trial testimony transcripts, 300 court documents, 
82. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1530-31. The Jordan court also notes that “the Supreme 
Court has never applied Turner to an Eighth Amendment case.” Id. at 1530. 
83. Id. at 1525 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
84. Id. at 1521; see also Colman v. Vasquez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 234 (D. Conn. 
2001) (involving a claim brought by an inmate assigned to the sexual trauma unit at FCI 
Danbury where the court found that “some aspects of [the inmate’s] claim resonate 
under the Eighth Amendment . . . to the extent the searches are alleged to have caused 
extreme emotional distress due to her circumstances as a sexually traumatized wo­
man”).  The inmate in Colman also brought a Fourth Amendment claim. Supra notes 
56-67 and accompanying text. R 
85. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1523, 1525.  While the 85% reported in this case is very 
high, the prominence of women who have histories of abuse, both physical and sexual, 
is startling.  In a 1999 survey by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 57.2% of female state 
prison inmates had been abused prior to incarceration, of those 46.5% had been physi­
cally abused and 39% had been sexually abused. CAROLINE  WOLF  HARLOW, U.S. 
DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, PRIOR ABUSE REPORTED BY INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 2, Table 
1 (1999), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/parip.pdf. 
86. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1523. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id.  This same inmate later settled a lawsuit arising from this incident against 
the guard and prison officials for $1,000, with an additional $10,000 in attorneys’ fees. 
Id. at 1523 n.2. 
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videotapes, six days of live testimony, and fifty-six exhibits.90  In 
affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Ninth Circuit included 
in its opinion summaries of inmate testimony regarding histories of 
sexual abuse.91 
In determining whether there was pain, the Ninth Circuit 
looked both at the fact that many of the inmates had histories of 
sexual or physical abuse, and at the fact “that physical, emotional, 
and psychological differences between men and women ‘may well 
cause women, and especially physically and sexually abused wo­
men, to react differently to searches of this type than would male 
inmates subjected to similar searches by women.’”92  Findings sup­
ported the idea that there was a high risk of great harm, including 
emotional pain and suffering and severe psychological injury even 
where the searches were conducted properly.93  Specifically, the 
court was worried about feelings of re-victimization that could re­
sult from “unwilling submission to bodily contact with the breasts 
and genitals.”94  The Ninth Circuit concluded that “[t]he record . . . 
support[ed] the postulate that women experience unwanted inti­
mate touching by men differently from men subject to comparable 
90. Id. at 1523-24. 
91. Id. at 1525.  These testimonies included an inmate whose “husband beat her, 
strangled her, and ran over her with a truck”; an inmate who “was frequently strapped 
or handcuffed to a bed” while being beaten or raped by her half-brother; another in­
mate who had been impregnated by her uncle at the age of sixteen who then attempted 
an impromptu abortion with a broom handle; and yet another inmate who had been 
raped, starved, and beaten by various men in her life. Id. 
92. Id. (quoting Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 3, Jordan v. Gardner, 
No. C89-339TB (W.D.Wash. Feb. 28, 1990)). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1526.  Even the proper performance of these pat searches was such that 
the district court refused to call them “pat searches.” Judge Reinhardt in his concurring 
opinion stated: 
While some modifications to the procedure may have occurred, the descrip­
tions by the prison personnel and inmates, the training material, and a video­
tape viewed by this court reveal that the searches involve nothing so delicate
 
or so tentative as “patting.”  Rather, the searches are intimate and deeply
 
invasive.
 
Id. at 1533 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).  For a description of the pat searches in this case, 
see supra note 7 and accompanying text. R 
The DOJ proposed standard on cross-gender supervision would provide a limited 
exemption for those inmates who could show documented evidence of cross-gender 
sexual assault while incarcerated.  National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond 
to Prison Rape, 76 Fed. Reg. 6,248, 6,289 (proposed Feb. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 28 
C.F.R. pt. 115).  This standard, while a good first step, does not prevent feelings of re-
victimization for any of the women reporting instances of sexual abuse prior to incar­
ceration. See supra note 85. R 
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touching by women”; therefore, “the cross-gender clothed body 
search policy constituted ‘infliction of pain.’”95 
The Ninth Circuit then examined the prison’s justifications for 
the policy to determine whether the infliction of pain had been “un­
necessary and wanton.”96  The court found that the cross-gender 
pat searches were not essential to prison security because there was 
no evidence showing that security had been impaired since the pre­
liminary injunctive relief had been implemented.97 
While employment concerns had been a sufficient legitimate 
governmental concern in prior cases involving constitutional 
claims,98 they were not here.99  The court distinguished Eighth 
Amendment claims, stating that “[i]t appears that none of the 
Eighth Amendment cases decided by the Supreme Court, this cir­
cuit, or any other court of appeals has upheld a pain-inflicting mea­
sure simply because prison officials implemented the policy to 
‘address’ a legitimate governmental interest.”100  Since there was 
not a government interest sufficient to sustain the use of cross-gen­
der pat searches, they were “unnecessary.”101 
The Ninth Circuit then found that the superintendent exercised 
wantonness in that he had been deliberately indifferent to the pain 
being caused to the inmates.102  The court acknowledged that he 
had been concerned about a potential lawsuit from the union, but, 
“[t]he wish to avoid a lawsuit from an employees’ union . . . does 
95. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1526; see also Colman v. Vasquez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 236 
(D. Conn. 2001).  In Colman, the court held that cross-gender pat searches of women in 
the sexual trauma unit may meet the “deliberately indifferent” standard found in condi­
tions of confinement cases and therefore dismissal on the pleadings was inappropriate. 
Id. at 235-37.  At the same time, the court acknowledged that Ms. Colman would need 
to show “extreme emotional distress” “[b]ecause routine discomfort is ‘part of the pen­
alty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Id. at 236 (quoting 
Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
96. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1526. 
97. Id. at 1526-27. 
98. See Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 962 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that em­
ployment concerns justify making gender based distinctions in deciding a male inmate’s 
Fourteenth Amendment claim); Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F. Supp. 2d 171, 181 (D. 
Conn. 2009) (holding that avoiding employment problems is a legitimate penological 
interest in response to an inmate’s First Amendment claim); see also infra Part II (dis­
cussing employment concerns further). 
99. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1527. 
100. Id.  It is interesting to compare the language, stating that a legitimate gov­
ernmental interest is not sufficient with the first factor of the Turner standard, which 
looks specifically for a rational relation to a legitimate governmental interest. Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
101. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1527. 
102. Id. at 1528-29. 
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not provide a justification for inflicting pain of a constitutional mag­
nitude.”103  That the superintendent had instituted the policy for a 
good reason, to avoid a lawsuit, was not sufficient justification to 
avoid being labeled as having acted wantonly.104  The court held 
that he neglected his responsibility to “afford sufficient weight to 
the constitutional rights of individuals,”105 resulting in “a lack of 
proper concern for the serious infringement of a countervailing 
constitutional interest.”106 
C. Federal Claims Not Based on the Constitution 
Inmate claims against cross-gender pat searches can originate 
from sources other than the Constitution.  An inmate who has a 
claim under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, for in­
stance, may also have a claim under either RFRA107 or RLUIPA.108 
Both RFRA and RLUIPA require any substantial burden placed 
on the exercise of religion to be justified by a compelling govern­
ment interest implemented in the least restrictive manner.109 
103. Id. at 1529. 
104. Id. 
105. Id.  The court held that “[i]f a prison administrator decides to ignore grave 
suffering because of irrelevant or unimportant concerns, that administrator demon­
strates a deliberate indifference to the harm being done and to the constitutional princi­
ple at stake.” Id.  This holding, referring to potential employment discrimination 
litigation as an “irrelevant or unimportant concern” is only seen in this case, and may 
well be a result of the unique facts presented. See id. 
106. Id. at 1530. 
107. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006). 
108. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000cc-1 (2006).  If an inmate is in a state institution, as opposed to a federal institu­
tion, they may not bring a claim under RFRA, which has been struck down by the 
Supreme Court as unconstitutional when applied to the states.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that RFRA, as applied to the states, exceeded con­
gressional authority to enact legislation under Section five of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment); see also Forde v. Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170, 175 (D. Conn. 2010) (“Although the 
Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its authority in making RFRA applicable 
against state and local governments, the Court also confirmed RFRA’s validity as ap­
plied to actions of the federal government.” (citation omitted)). RLUIPA, however, 
has not been found unconstitutional, and unlike RFRA, it explicitly references protec­
tions for institutionalized persons.  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.  RLUIPA states that: 
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a 
person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results 
from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that 
imposition of the burden on that person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling 
government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling government interest. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. 
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Under either RFRA or RLUIPA, “[a] substantial burden exists 
where the state ‘puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify 
his behavior and to violate his beliefs.’”110  A RFRA or RLUIPA 
claim allows an inmate to avoid the stringent Turner standards that 
apply to a First Amendment claim. 
In Forde v. Baird, Forde, an observant Sunni Muslim, brought 
a claim that FCI Danbury’s cross-gender pat search policy violated 
her religious rights under RFRA.111  FCI Danbury alleged that the 
practice did not place a substantial burden on Forde’s religious free­
doms because submission to cross-gender pat searches is involun­
tary, and she was therefore not permitting a man outside her family 
to touch her.112  The district court rejected this argument.113  Forde 
produced evidence that cross-gender pat searches violated her sin­
cerely held religious beliefs, and “[t]he opinions of the . . . [prison’s] 
religious authorities cannot trump the plaintiff’s sincere and relig­
ious belief.”114  In response, the prison “allege[d] two compelling 
governmental interests . . . (1) maintaining the safety and security of 
the facility and (2) avoiding staffing and employment problems.”115 
Regarding FCI Danbury’s interest in safety and security, the 
district court referred to the argument as “a strawman” in that it 
“focuse[d] on the pat search component of cross-gender pat 
searches, rather than the cross-gender component of those 
searches.”116  FCI Danbury did not satisfy its burden of proving 
that pat searches of Forde by male officers served security interests, 
it merely argued that pat searches generally serve a compelling gov­
ernmental interest.117 
Indeed, Forde presented evidence showing that there may be pe­
nological disadvantages to cross-gender pat searches due to the 
possibility of falsified reports of sexual harassment lodged against 
110. Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F. Supp. 2d 171, 177 (D. Conn. 2009) (quoting Jolly 
v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
111. Forde v. Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170, 171-72 (D. Conn. 2010). Ms. Forde’s 
claim was brought under RFRA because she was housed at an institution run by the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 172-76.  Ms. Forde also brought her claim under the 
First Amendment. See supra note 40. R 
112. Forde, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 176. 
113. Id. (“To conclude that Forde is mistaken regarding whether her religious 
beliefs are offended by cross-gender pat searches—and therefore hold that her free 
exercise rights have not been substantially burdened—would contravene clear 
precedent.”). 
114. Id. at 177 (quoting Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 590 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
115. Id. at 177-78. 
116. Id. at 178. 
117. Id. 
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male correctional officers by female inmates and the possibility 
that male officers would pat search female inmates less thor­
oughly to avoid such false claims—an assertion that [FCI Dan-
bury] contested, though failed to disprove.118 
The district court then held that FCI Danbury had “not pre­
sent[ed] persuasive evidence that . . . staffing and employment is­
sues present a compelling governmental interest.”119  Specifically it 
had “offered no evidence that granting Forde an exemption from 
non-emergency cross-gender pat searches would lead FCI Danbury 
to violate Title VII at all.”120 
Even assuming that FCI Danbury had managed to provide evi­
dence supporting either its security or staffing concerns, it had not 
shown that “cross-gender pat searches of Forde [were] the least re­
strictive means of accomplishing those goals.”121  “Because the bur­
den rests with the government, it is insufficient for [FCI Danbury] 
to simply say that something cannot be done without exploring al­
ternatives.”122  FCI Danbury failed to present any evidence at trial 
that it had considered alternative means of accommodating Forde’s 
religious freedom.123  Furthermore, FCI Danbury “failed to present 
any evidence as to why many state penal institutions forbid non-
emergency cross-gender pat searches, but [it] is incapable of doing 
118. Id.  Cross-gender pat searches increase the potential for allegations of sexual 
assault. See infra notes 133-139 and accompanying text.  An allegation of sexual assault R 
interferes with prison security because “[c]ompromised personnel . . . have been found 
to have provided contraband to prisoners, accepted bribes, lied to federal investigators, 
and committed other serious crimes as a result of their sexual involvement with federal 
prisoners.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S EFFORTS TO PREVENT STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE OF FEDERAL 
INMATES:  SEPTEMBER 2009, i (2009) [hereinafter STAFF  SEXUAL  ABUSE], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/e0904.pdf.  Second, fearing an allegation of sex­
ual assault, corrections officers may be more timid when performing a cross-gender pat 
search and therefore the pat search itself may not be as effective. See Everson v. Mich. 
Dep’t of Corrections, 391 F.3d 737, 745, 754 n. 24 (6th Cir. 2006) (three correctional 
experts testified that male staff might be particularly hesitant to perform supervisory 
duties of female inmates because of a “natural reluctance” resulting in a failure to “con­
duct the security searches and procedures necessary” to control contraband in female 
inmate living areas). Contra BOOZ  ALLEN  HAMILTON, PRISON  RAPE  ELIMINATION 
ACT (PREA) COST IMPACT ANALYSIS 14 (2010), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
programs/pdfs/preacostimpactanalysis.pdf (“There was a common sentiment that pat 
downs were equally effective by either gender and potentially equally abused by either 
gender.”). 
119. Forde, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 179. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 180. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
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the same.”124  While prison administrators are given due deference 
in light of their expertise, FCI Danbury could not “simply claim 
that the safety or security . . . [would] be negatively impacted . . . 
without showing evidence of how the facility would be negatively 
impacted.”125 
Regarding FCI Danbury’s employment concerns, the district 
court found compelling that “the vast majority of pat searches occur 
at predictable times and places,” presumably making it easy to im­
plement a plan accommodating Forde’s religious freedoms.126  In 
response to FCI Danbury’s concern that gender-based shift assign­
ments would violate either Title VII or the union contract the court 
stated that “gender-based assignment of shifts, even where it pre­
vents correctional officers from selecting preferred assignments, is a 
‘minimal restriction’ that can be tolerated.”127  Because FCI Dan-
bury had not met its burden to show that cross-gender pat searching 
Forde was the least restrictive alternative for fulfilling a compelling 
government interest, the court ordered the prison “to grant [Forde] 
an individual exemption to the policy of non-emergency cross-gen­
der pat searches.”128 
D. Decreasing the Possibility for Sexual Assault 
Each of the potential inmate claims discussed heretofore result 
from the existence of the cross-gender pat search in and of itself, 
and would exist regardless of whether the pat search was performed 
professionally.  The use of cross-gender pat searches, however, also 
increases the risk of sexual assault by corrections staff against in­
mates.129  In 2003, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 181. 
127. Id. (citing Tipler v. Douglas Cnty., 482 F.3d 1023, 1027 (8th Cir. 2007); 
Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 
1539 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J. concurring)).  “[E]ven if male employment rights at 
FCI Danbury might collide with Forde’s free exercise rights, those employment rights 
would not necessarily prevail.” Id. at 182.  Where employment concerns collide with 
constitutional rights, resolution “‘requires a careful inquiry as to whether the competing 
interests can be satisfactorily accommodated before deciding whether one interest must 
be vindicated to the detriment of the other.’” Id. (quoting Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 
1212 (2d Cir. 1980)); see infra notes 285-300 (discussing the role of compromise in rec- R 
onciling inmates’ rights to be free from cross-gender pat searches and correctional staff 
employment rights). 
128. Forde, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 182-83. 
129. PREA REPORT, supra note 10, at 6-7 (explaining that while physical R 
searches, such as pat searches, are necessary “[t]he potential for abuse is heightened . . . 
when staff of the opposite gender conduct them”). 
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Act (PREA) “to protect incarcerated individuals from sexual 
abuse.”130  Congress found that rape within prisons can have a 
number of consequences, not the least of which is a potential viola­
tion of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment.131  Statistics revealed in a 2009 study on staff sexual 
abuse of federal inmates demonstrate the dangers inherent in al­
lowing cross-gender pat searches.132 
The information gathered in the report indicates that there 
were more cross-gender allegations of sexually abusive behavior 
than there were same-gender allegations.133  Of these, the number 
of allegations against female staff by male inmates exceeded the 
number involving male staff with female inmates.134  This was true, 
despite the fact that only 26.5% of the staff was female.135 
130. Id. at 1.  Purposes of the act include “establish[ing] a zero-tolerance standard 
for the incidence of prison rape in prisons in the United States,” and “mak[ing] the 
prevention of prison rape a top priority in each prison system.”  42 U.S.C. § 15602 
(2006). 
131. 42 U.S.C. § 15601.  In a 2009 report, the U.S. Department of Justice found 
that: 
Staff sexual abuse of prisoners has severe consequences for victims, under­
mines the safety and security of prisons, and in some cases leads to other 
crimes.  Prisoners who are victims of staff sexual abuse may suffer physical 
pain, fear, humiliation, degradation, and desperation, and this harm can last 
beyond the victims’ incarceration. 
STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 118, at i. R 
Furthermore, the OIG report raises the concern that female prisoners, who are 
more likely to have histories of sexual abuse, can suffer even greater traumatization 
when subjected to “further abuse inflicted by correctional staff while in [federal] cus­
tody,” a concern that mirrors discussions above in regards to the Fourth and Eighth 
Amendments. Id.; see supra notes 63-66, 84-95 and accompanying text. R 
132. STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 118.  This study was based on data gath- R 
ered pertaining to fiscal years 2001-2008. Id. 
133. Id. at 30.  Of the 1556 total allegations of sexual abuse, 62% were cross-
gender. Id. Allegations of sexual assault were broken into two categories, sexual 
abuse, which involves criminal activity, and sexual misconduct, which is relegated to 
relatively minor incidences such as “indecent language, gestures, or sexually oriented 
visual surveillance.” Id. at 19.  Sexual abuse was broken down into three categories, 
aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse of a ward, and abusive sexual contact. Id. at 23. 
Aggravated sexual abuse is “engaging in a sexual act with an inmate by threat or force,” 
sexual abuse of a ward is “engaging in a sexual act with an inmate.” Id. 
In total there were 1585 allegations of inappropriate sexual behavior by staff to­
wards inmates, and of these, 65% (1,028) alleged sexual abuse. Id. at 20. The number 
of allegations included in this statistic more than doubled between 2001 and 2008, 
meaning that the rate of increase in allegations of staff sexual assault was greater than 
either the growth of the inmate or staff population. Id. at 19. 
134. Id.  The percentage of allegations involving female staff members and male 
inmates was 53%, while the percentage of allegations involving male staff members and 
female inmates was only 47%. Id. 
135. Id. 
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Between 2001 and 2008, there were eighty-six accusations of 
abusive sexual contact, a category of sexually abusive behavior, by 
male staff against female inmates, and seventy accusations of abu­
sive sexual contact by female staff against male inmates.136  Bureau 
of Prison (BOP) officials “believe[ ] that male staff members were 
most often accused of sexual misconduct stemming from pat 
searches.”137 
If the BOP’s belief is accurate, then correct reporting would 
reveal a much higher number of incidents of cross-gender abusive 
sexual contact, much of it a result of pat searches.138  Therefore, 
cross-gender pat searches expose federal inmates to an increased 
risk of criminal sexual assault, implicating the Eighth Amendment, 
and threatening not only the health and safety of inmates but also 
the security of prison facilities.139 
II. EMPLOYEES: WHAT’S THE BIG DEAL?140 
Women have traditionally met resistance when attempting to 
secure employment within prison facilities, especially those classi­
fied as maximum security housing male inmates.141  While numbers 
136. Id. at 26, 28.  While men were subject to more total allegations of abusive 
cross-gender sexual contact, female employees were subject to allegations at a much 
higher rate than their representation in the BOP workforce. Id. at 28. The percentage 
of female staff members was only 26.5%, yet they accounted for 45% of the total allega­
tions of abusive cross-gender sexual contact. Id.  This discrepancy appears again in sta­
tistics including all variations of sexual abuse.  “Approximately 6 percent of all female 
staff members were the subjects of allegations . . . predominantly of cross-gender of­
fenses . . . .” Id. at 28-29.  Only four percent of male staff was accused of sexual abuse. 
Id. at 29. 
137. Id. at 26.  Because pat searches involve touching, these incidences should be 
properly classified in the criminal category of abusive sexual contact rather than the 
non-criminal category of sexual misconduct. Id.  Sexual misconduct only includes non­
physical incidents such as obscene gestures. See supra note 136. “[T]he high number of R 
abusive sexual contact allegations provides some support for the BOP’s perception.” 
STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 118, at 26. R 
138. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. R 
139. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. R 
140. This portion of the Note largely will focus on the difficulties of women 
seeking employment, rather than men.  This is because, traditionally, men have not had 
the same difficulties as women in finding corrections employment. See supra notes 50, R 
130-131 and accompanying text. R 
141. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 337 (1977) (upholding the use of 
gender-based bona fide occupational qualification prohibiting women from working in 
contact positions in a male maximum security prison); SUSAN  EHRLICH  MARTIN  & 
NANCY C. JURIK, DOING  JUSTICE, DOING  GENDER: WOMEN IN  LAW AND  CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE OCCUPATIONS 164 (1996) (“Researchers have anticipated that the greatest re­
sistance to women [corrections officers] would occur in maximum security prisons.”). 
On July 31, 2009 the Federal Bureau of Prisons reported that only 17.57% of the staff in 
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of women working in corrections have grown since the late 1970’s, 
they still represent a relatively small percentage of corrections staff 
as compared to their presence in the total workforce.142  In order to 
understand the importance of protecting female jobs within male 
prisons, it is essential to understand the history of women in correc­
tions, the effect that Title VII has had on their employment, and 
their current presence in prisons today. 
A. Women in Corrections Before Title VII 
In the United States, women worked in corrections as early as 
1793, when Mary Weed became known for her humane treatment 
of both male and female inmates at the Walnut Street Jail.143  Wo­
men like Ms. Weed were a rarity prior to 1861, when more women 
began to enter correctional work.144 
The first significant movement of women into corrections oc­
curred between 1860 and 1900.145  Small groups of women reform­
ers entered prisons in order to improve conditions for female 
inmates, whom they felt were “morally superior to men.”146  The 
reformers demanded separate prisons for women, which would be 
run by women and would offer “homelike atmospheres of 
rehabilitation.”147 
Prior to this effort, women had been housed in joint facilities 
with male prisoners.148  The creation of women’s prisons in the 
1900s led to work opportunities for women corrections staff in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.149  Women became 
its male high security prisons were female.  Compare this number with 23.6% female at 
medium security prisons, 25.06% at low security prisons, and 34.16% at minimum se­
curity prisons. FEDERAL  BUREAU OF  PRISONS, STAFF  DEMOGRAPHIC  CHARACTERIS­
TICS—ALL STAFF (2009) (on file with author).  Reports relating to each Federal Bureau 
of Prisons institution were provided to the author on September 18, 2009 in response to 
an August 26, 2009 Freedom of Information Act request. The reports were then com­
piled in order to calculate these statistics. 
142. MARTIN & JURIK, supra note 141, at 157. R 
143. Id. at 158. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id.  These religious reformers’ actions were based on a feeling of a “shared 
[ ] common bond of innate, womanly spirit.” Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 158-59. 
149. Id. at 159. 
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administrators and jail matrons of both women’s and juvenile facili­
ties by emphasizing stereotypical “womanly qualities.”150 
Unfortunately, prison success was often due to adopting the 
“warehouse-like character of men’s prisons.”151  As women’s pris­
ons began to more closely resemble men’s prisons, they were in­
creasingly run by men.152  Meanwhile, in the 1930s and 1940s, 
women were allowed to volunteer as clerical staff in male prisons, 
but were given no opportunity to supervise the inmates.153 
B. Civil Rights Movements and the Implementation of Title VII 
“The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) was enacted to eradi­
cate employment discrimination and compensate victims of discrim­
ination.”154  Through Title VII, Congress intended to “‘remov[e] 
. . . artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment 
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of 
racial or other impermissible classification[s].’”155  Title VII meant 
that men could work in women’s prisons and that women could 
work in men’s prisons, although opportunities were still limited.156 
The first Title VII employment challenge relating to prison 
cross-gender supervision to reach the Supreme Court occurred 
more than ten years after the enactment of Title VII.157  In Dothard 
v. Rawlinson, Ms. Rawlinson sought employment as a “correctional 
counselor” with the Alabama Board of Corrections.158  Her appli­
cation was rejected because she failed to meet a statutory weight 
requirement of 120 lbs.159  Rawlinson filed a class action suit alleg­
ing that she had been denied employment opportunities because of 
her gender in contravention of Title VII.160 
While the case was pending, the Alabama Board of Correc­
tions adopted a Regulation requiring that corrections officers in 
150. Id.  Valued womanly characteristics included “inherently emotional and 
sympathetic natures.” Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 159-60. 
154. Smith, supra note 8, at 268; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). R 
155. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328 (1977) (quoting Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). 
156. Jurado, supra note 23, at 23. R 
157. Smith, supra note 8, at 269. R 
158. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 323. 
159. Id.  The statute also required a minimum height of 5’2”. Id. at 323-24. 
160. Id. at 324.  Ms. Rawlinson also claimed that the use of height and weight 
requirements was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. Id. 
591 
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“contact positions” with inmates at maximum security penitentia­
ries be the same gender as the inmate.161  The new regulation made 
it so that women could only compete for approximately 25% of the 
corrections officers’ jobs available within the Alabama prison sys­
tem.162  Rawlinson amended her complaint to include challenges to 
this new regulation as violating both Title VII and Equal 
Protection.163 
The Court found that the height and weight requirements dis­
qualified “41.13% of the female population.”164  The same restric­
tions would “exclud[e] less than 1% of the male population.”165 
Based on these statistics, the Court found that Rawlinson had suffi­
ciently demonstrated that the requirements, while facially neutral, 
had a disproportionate discriminatory effect.166 
The burden shifted to Alabama to show that the height and 
weight “‘requirement[s] [had] a manifest relationship to the em­
ployment’” as a correctional officer.167  Alabama claimed that the 
weight and height requirements bear “a relationship to strength, a 
sufficient but unspecified amount of which is essential to effective 
job performance.”168  The Court was unconvinced, stating that if 
strength is a bona fide job-related quality, then Alabama should 
adopt a test which measures strength.169  As a result of its failure to 
show manifest relationship between weight and height and job per­
formance in the face of disproportionate discriminatory effect, Ala­
bama had violated Title VII.170 
The Court then turned to the gender-based regulation to deter­
mine whether it violated Title VII.171  Unlike the height and weight 
requirements, the new regulation facially discriminated against ap­
plicants based on gender.172  Alabama claimed that the regulation 
was a bona-fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).173  A BFOQ 
161. Id. at 324-25. 
162. Id. at 327-28. 
163. Id. at 325-26. 
164. Id. at 329-30. 
165. Id. at 330. 
166. Id. at 329, 331. 
167. Id. at 329. 
168. Id. at 331. 
169. Id. at 332.  A strength measuring test would not violate Title VII because it 
would “‘measure[ ] the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.’” Id. 
(quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971)). 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 333. 
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permits gender-based discrimination where that qualification is 
“reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular 
business or enterprise.”174  The BFOQ exception is “only the nar­
rowest of exceptions to the general rule requiring equality of em­
ployment opportunities.”175  BFOQ’s are not allowed to be used by 
employers “to refuse to hire an individual woman or man on the 
basis of stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.”176  Therefore, 
generally “the argument that a particular job is too dangerous for 
women” would not create a BFOQ.177  In this case, however, the 
Court upheld the use of a gender-based BFOQ.178 
The Court found that the circumstances of the Alabama maxi­
mum security penitentiaries were unique.179  The prisons had al­
ready been found unconstitutionally dangerous.180  Furthermore, 
twenty percent of the male prisoners were sex offenders.181  The sex 
offenders were scattered throughout the various prison dormito­
ries.182  Because of the level of danger involved, in conjunction with 
the number of sex offenders, the Court held that “[t]he likelihood 
that inmates would assault a woman because she was a woman 
would pose a real threat not only to the victim of the assault but 
also to the” security of the penitentiary as a whole.183  As a result 
“[t]he employee’s very womanhood would . . . directly undermine 
her capacity to provide the security that is the essence of a correc­
tional counselor’s responsibility.”184 
Despite the negative outcome of Dothard, women were able to 
make their way into corrections positions.185  Generally, courts 
174. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006)). 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 335.  “[T]he purpose of Title VII [is] to allow the individual woman to 
make that choice for herself.” Id. 
178. Id. at 336-37. 
179. Id. at 334. 
180. Id. (“[A] Federal District Court has held that the conditions of confinement 
in the prisons of the State, characterized by ‘rampant violence’ and a ‘jungle atmos­
phere’ are constitutionally intolerable.” (quoting Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325 
(M.D. Ala. 1976))). 
181. Id. at 335. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 336.  Because the essence of a correction officer’s job is to maintain 
security, a threat to security of the institution as a whole based on gender can create a 
BFOQ. Id. at 335.  The reasoning behind the BFOQ is not paternalistic protection of 
women, but rather that there is “[m]ore . . . at stake in this case . . . than an individual 
woman’s decision to weigh and accept the risks of employment.” Id. 
184. Id. at 336. 
185. Jurado, supra note 23, at 27. R 
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failed to find the same unique set of circumstances that made the 
Alabama prisons so dangerous and therefore justified a BFOQ.186 
C. Women Working in Prisons Now 
Legal problems, however, are not the only issue faced by wo­
men attempting to find employment in male prisons.  Even now, 
women continue to battle issues including paternalism, sexual har­
assment, and gender stereotypes regarding their ability to do a 
classically masculine job.187  There is also a perception that male 
inmates will be resistant to female officers.188  Studies have shown, 
however, that staff resistance to women corrections officers is 
greater than inmate resistance;189 inmates are generally receptive to 
women.190  These lingering issues may explain why women continue 
to be under utilized in the field of corrections, comprising only 
about 26% of the workforce for the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP).191 
186. Id. 
187. See MARTIN & JURIK, supra note 141, at 168-79 (stating that traditional con- R 
ceptions of female incompetence, including perceptions of women as “little sisters” who 
accept male protection or “seductresses,” reinforces the feeling of “working-class mas­
culinity,” which may be threatened by strong, competent, female correctional officers); 
Richard H. Rison, Women as High-Security Officers: Gender-Neutral Employment in 
High-Security Prisons, 3 FED. PRISONS J. 19, 20 (1994) (discussing “myths about women 
in the workplace” including that they do not want to be promoted, that advancement is 
precluded by family life, and that women do not have the necessary skills for 
advancement). 
188. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  JUSTICE, NATIONAL  INSTITUTE OF  CORRECTIONS, 
WOMEN AS  CORRECTIONAL  OFFICERS IN  MEN’S  MAXIMUM  SECURITY  FACILITIES: A 
SURVEY OF THE  FIFTY  STATES 3 (1991), available at www.nicic.org/pubs/1991/ 
009504.pdf. 
189. Id. at 3 (noting that staff resistance from male corrections officers often 
came from a perception “that women need protection and wouldn’t perform well in 
emergencies”).  During the survey, Kentucky noted that their “paranoia” regarding as­
saults on female staff turned out to be groundless. Id. at 14. 
The State of Connecticut recently settled a case involving fourteen female correc­
tions officers for $2.5 million; the women alleged that “they were subject to sexually 
demeaning remarks by mail [sic] prison guards and even recruited as prostitutes.” 
Thomas B. Scheffey, Female Prison Guards Settle for $2.5 Million, CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 
11, 2010, at 14.  Sexually demeaning comments made in front of inmates placed female 
guards “at risk of attack.” Id.  Male guards would also interrupt walk-talkie transmis­
sions from female guards, thereby “making it difficult or impossible to call for help or 
extricate themselves from dangerous situations.” Id. 
190. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 188, at 3; MARTIN & JURIK, supra R 
note 141, at 168-179.  Inmates may be resistant either for privacy concerns or because R 
they are hesitant to take orders from a woman. Id. 
191. Women comprised approximately 46.3% of the total work force in 1998 and 
were projected to comprise 48% by 2015.  Howard N. Fullerton, Jr., Labor Force Par­
ticipation: 75 Years of Change, 1950-98 and 1998-2025, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1, 10 (Dec. 
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This underutilization comes despite recognition that women 
have a positive impact on conditions within prisons.  Prisons have 
reported that female corrections officers may have a calming influ­
ence on male inmates.192  Furthermore, female staff tend to have a 
normalizing effect, better preparing inmates to face the outside 
world.193  Some states noted an improved ability to staff prisons be­
cause of a greater pool of applicants.194  Finally, unusual benefits 
such as “fewer grievances . . . , [that] women’s presence has made 
male officers more attentive to assignments . . . , and [that] women 
are more observant and attentive than male officers,” were 
noted.195  Interestingly, several systems noted that women bring a 
new, less confrontational, perspective to problem-solving.196 
Currently, there are 8,623 women working for the Federal 
BOP.197  Of those, 6,385 (74%) work in entirely male prisons, com­
prising 24.4% of the workforce.198  Another 1,497 female staff work 
1999) available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1999/12/art1full.pdf.  Even the 26% fe­
male workforce is a vast improvement for the BOP, however.  In 1988, twenty-four 
years after Title VII was enacted, only 7% of the BOP’s workforce were women. MAR­
TIN & JURIK, supra note 141, at 164. R 
192. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  JUSTICE, supra note 188, at 4. The following states R 
referenced the calming effect of women on male inmates: Alaska (“not[ing] that in­
mates control their behavior and maintain better hygiene when women are present”), 
Colorado (noting that the presence of women “tends to defuse a critical incident rather 
than escalate one”), Hawaii (noting that women have an “ability to diffuse tensions and 
tone down the harshness and violence of the facility environment”), Idaho (noting that 
“inmates are said to be calmer and to deal with women staff on a different level than 
they do men”), Illinois (noting that female presence “improves male inmates’ tempera­
ment and mannerisms” leading to a reduction of “‘macho’ behavior”), Indiana, Kansas 
(noting that inmates are now “easier to handle and better behaved”), Minnesota, Mon­
tana (referring to “their calming effect on inmates” as the “main benefit” of women 
corrections officers), Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma (citing women’s 
ability “to keep [a] lid on hostile situations”), Oregon (acknowledging both the calming 
effect, and an improvement in inmates’ personal appearances), Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Tennessee (noting that women “are given more respect and inmates are quieter 
and better-behaved around them”), Washington (noting “reduced levels of violence, 
less need for confrontation to enforce rules, cleaner cell blocks, [and] inmates’ hygiene 
improved”), and Wyoming. Id. at 6-34. 
193. Id. at 4. 
194. Id. 
195. Id.  Idaho, in particular, noted that the number of grievances had dropped 
from between seventy to eighty per month to a high of about fifteen. Id. at 10. 
196. Id. at 16.  Illinois noted that inmates benefit from observing women use 
“their brains rather than brawn” during conflict resolution. Id. at 11.  Similarly Ken­
tucky noted that women have taught both inmates and male staff better, healthier con­
flict resolution skills. Id. at 14. 
197. See infra Tables 2, 3 & 4. 
198. See infra Table 4. 
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in mixed gender facilities.199  Only 8.5% (741) of the women work­
ing for the BOP work in an entirely female institution.200  This 
makes sense given that women comprise 26% of the workforce but 
only 7% of the inmate population.201  While there are 108 male and 
mixed gender institutions in the BOP, there are only seven female 
institutions.202 
Men also work in cross-gender supervisory positions.  Cur­
rently there are 958 men working in the BOP’s seven entirely fe­
male facilities.203  Within those facilities, men comprise approxi­
mately 56% of the workforce.204  FCI Waseca has the highest per­
centage of male staffing at approximately 70%, while FCI Alderson 
has the lowest at approximately 41%.205 
III. COMPARING RIGHTS: DOES ONE SET TAKE PRECEDENCE? 
This section of the Note examines the conflict between inmate 
rights implicated by cross-gender pat searches and employment 
rights in light of both preexisting case law and current empirical 
evidence.  Ultimately, the conclusion is reached that inmates’ con­
stitutional rights take precedence over the employment rights of 
corrections staff, and therefore the use of non-emergency cross-gen­
der pat searches should be abolished.206 
199. See infra Table 3. 
200. See infra Table 2. 
201. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  JUSTICE, FEDERAL  BUREAU OF  PRISONS, STATE OF 
THE  BUREAU 2007 BUREAU OF  PRISONS STAFF: EVERYDAY  HEROES 52 (2007). The 
statistic for the percentage of female inmates is as of 2007. Id. 
202. See infra Tables 2, 3 & 4. 
203. See infra Table 2. 
204. See infra Table 2. 
205. See infra Table 2. 
206. While this Note focuses on the legal rights of both inmates and employees, 
as well as the responsibilities of the various correctional institutions, it is important to 
recognize that there is a financial aspect to this debate.  Based on a study of the cost 
impact of the PREA Commission standards, the “Limits to Cross-Gender Viewing and 
Searches” standard is expected to have the highest on-going cost impact. See BOOZ 
ALLEN HAMILTON, supra note 118, at 14.  “The underlying cause of this impact is attrib- R 
uted solely to the prohibition of cross-gender pat down searches within the standard.” 
Id.  This standard also had one of the lowest levels of pre-existing compliance. Id.  One 
“environmental driver” supporting cross-gender pat searches is cited as “local or state 
laws that mandate equal opportunity employment, which create a barrier to removing 
cross-gender pat down searches.” Id. at 15.  Overall, compliance with the standard is 
estimated at over $21 million in upfront costs and around $90 million in on-going costs 
annually. Id. at 11. 
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A. Men Working in Women’s Prisons 
The case for ending cross-gender pat searches is more compel­
ling for female inmates.207  The reasons behind this discrepancy are 
two-fold.  First, society has been more willing to recognize and re­
spect female inmates’ constitutional rights;208 second, the threat of 
employment discrimination against men in corrections is not per­
ceived as being as dire because men do not have an established 
history of employment discrimination.209 
When women have challenged cross-gender pat searches under 
the Fourth and Eighth Amendments their rights have been up­
held.210  One reason to uphold a female inmates’ challenge, as 
opposed to a male’s, is that women are recognized as “‘experi­
ence[ing] unwanted intimate touching by men differently from men 
subject to comparable touching by women.’”211  The Eighth 
Amendment provides a further advantage for inmates seeking to 
challenge cross-gender pat searches because it is uninhibited by the 
Turner test’s reasonableness standard.212 
Jordan v. Gardner is one example where female inmates suc­
ceeded in challenging cross-gender pat searches.213 Jordan can be 
interpreted as an anomaly in light of the uniquely compelling cir­
cumstances presented by that case (84% of the inmates had histo­
ries of sexual assault).214  Current nationwide statistics for female 
prisoners with a history of sexual assault are similarly compelling. 
207. Schlanger, supra note 15, at 5 (stating that because of the greater impact on R 
female job employment, the lesser extent of histories of sexual assault, and lower fre­
quencies of sexual victimization by correctional staff, “a prohibition on non-emergency 
pat-downs . . . is less urgent for male prisoners”). 
208. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1534 (9th Cir. 1993); Colman v. Vas­
quez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 232 (D. Conn. 2001) (holding that female inmates’ privacy 
rights are “qualitatively different” than men’s privacy rights). 
209. See Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 962 (7th Cir. 1983). 
210. See Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1522-23; Colman, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 230, 235 (D. 
Conn. 2001).  Men making similar claims are often not successful. See Smith v. Fair-
man, 678 F.2d 52, 53 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that cross-gender pat searches “clearly 
fall[ ] short of the kind of shocking, barbarious [sic] treatment proscribed by the Eighth 
Amendment,” and further concluding that they do not violate the Fourth Amendment 
either); supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text. R 
211. Colman, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (quoting Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1526). This 
Note does not directly address whether the assertion that women experience unwanted 
touching from the opposite gender differently than men is valid. For a discussion on the 
interaction between gender stereotypes and the challenges to cross-gender supervision 
see Jurado, supra note 23, at 39-53; Smith, supra note 8, at 276-83. R 
212. See supra notes 31, 82-83 and accompanying text. R 
213. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1525. 
214. Id. 
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In 1999, 39% of female state prison inmates reported sexual abuse 
prior to incarceration.215  Inmates who are sexually victimized while 
incarcerated would, presumably, increase the percentage of women 
incarcerated who have suffered sexual victimization above 39%.  In 
a survey conducted for the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) 
Commission, 5% of women reported being sexually assaulted 
within the previous twelve months (compared with 3% of men).216 
These statistics show that over a third of female state inmates sub­
jected to cross-gender pat searches could face the feelings of re-
victimization that the Ninth Circuit in Jordan held constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment.217 
While Fourth and Eighth Amendment challenges result from 
the act of the cross-gender pat search in and of itself, there is also a 
concern that cross-gender pat searches expose female inmates to 
greater instances of sexual assault.  This concern was addressed by 
the PREA Commission’s standard prohibiting cross-gender pat 
searches.218  The PREA Commission found that “searches carried 
out by staff of the opposite gender heighten the potential for 
abuse.”219 
The PREA Commission’s findings were corroborated by the 
findings of the Department of Justice in its study of staff sexual 
abuse.220  “BOP officials believe[ ] that male staff . . . were most 
often accused of sexual misconduct [relating to] pat searches.”221 
Furthermore, cross-gender pat searches heighten the risk for sexual 
assault beyond solely abusive sexual contact or sexual misconduct. 
In Colman v. Vasquez, a cross-gender pat search started with abu­
sive sexual contact, and escalated, over the course of months, to 
rape.222  Between 2001 and 2008, there were 234 allegations of ei­
ther sexual abuse or aggravated sexual abuse against male staff to­
wards female inmates.223  It is impossible to determine how many of 
these may have been initiated with a cross-gender pat search. 
215. HARLOW, supra note 85, at 1.  Only 5.8% of male state prison inmates made R 
the same claim. Id. 
216. PREA REPORT, supra note 10, at 41. R 
217. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. R 
218. PREA REPORT, supra note 10, at 62. R 
219. Id. 
220. See supra notes 132-137 and accompanying text. R 
221. STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 118, at 26. R 
222. Colman v. Vasequez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 226 (D. Conn. 2001) (involving an 
inmate subjected to several months of sexual harassment that had started with a cross-
gender pat search where the officer made inappropriate advances and “culminat[ed] in 
a physical assault”). 
223. STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 118, at 26. R 
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There are also indications of strong societal movement toward 
the prohibition of cross-gender pat searches in female institu­
tions.224  Twenty-five states have voluntarily limited cross-gender 
pat searches of female inmates to emergency circumstances only.225 
An additional three states (and Washington, D.C.) completely pro­
hibit cross-gender pat searches on females.226  Of the remaining 
states, only eleven (and the Federal Bureau of Prisons) generally 
allow cross-gender pat searches.227  This trend is not only indicative 
of societal views on women and cross-gender pat searches, but on 
the feasibility of limiting these dangerous pat searches in women’s 
prisons.  This showing of feasibility strengthens other cross-gender 
pat search challenges.  In Forde v. Zickefoose, a federal district 
court questioned whether cross-gender pat searches were the least 
restrictive means to fulfill security and employment concerns given 
the prevalence of states that do not use them.228 
Balanced against the female inmate’s rights enumerated above, 
is a male corrections officer’s right to be free from employment dis­
crimination.  Male corrections officers do not have the same history 
of discrimination in employment that women do; therefore, the le­
gitimate penological interest of equalizing job opportunities is not 
as compelling.229  Current employment statistics support that men 
224. While this Note addresses this issue by focusing on societal movements and 
changes in the law within the United States, a compelling argument can be made on the 
basis of international law.  The United Nation’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat­
ment of Prisoners suggest a complete ban of cross-gender supervision for female in­
mates. UNITED  NATIONS, STANDARD  MINIMUM  RULES FOR THE  TREATMENT OF 
PRISONERS Rule 53(3), at 8 (1977), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/ 
treatmentprisoners.pdf  (“Women prisoners shall be attended and supervised only by 
women officers.”); see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE”: VIO­
LATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, http://www.amnestyusa.org/ 
document.php?id=D0F5C2222D1AABEA8025690000692FC4&lang=e (last visited Jan. 
23, 2011). 
225. See infra Table 1. 
226. See infra Table 1; AMNESTY  INTERNATIONAL, ABUSE OF  WOMEN IN  CUS­
TODY:  SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AND SHACKLING OF PREGNANT WOMEN, POLICIES, PRO­
CEDURES AND PRACTICES OF GUARDING WOMEN, http://www.amnestyusa.org/violence­
against-women/abuse-of-women-in-custody/key-findings-policies-procedures-and­
practices-of-guarding-women/page.do?id=1108299 (last visited Jan. 23, 2011) [hereinaf­
ter ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY]. 
227. See infra Table 1; ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 226. R 
228. Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F. Supp. 2d 171, 178 (D. Conn. 2009). Using this 
same reasoning, a male inmate’s claim is not as strong because states have not similarly 
chosen to forego cross-gender pat searches in male prisons. 
229. Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 962 (7th Cir. 1983); see Tharp v. Iowa 
Dep’t of Corr., 68 F.3d 223, 226 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that the court will uphold “a . . . 
reasonable gender-based job assignment policy, particularly a policy that is favorable to 
 
 
 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE211.txt unknown Seq: 33 27-SEP-11 10:25 
2011] CROSS-GENDER PAT SEARCHES 599 
do not have difficulty securing employment in corrections.  As of 
July 2009, there were 24,766 men working with the Federal BOP, 
and of those, only 958 men (3%) worked at a facility housing solely 
female inmates.230  As a result, even if all positions involving cross-
gender pat searches were abolished through a BFOQ, only a very 
small percentage of men in corrections would be affected. 
Women have strong claims against cross-gender pat searches 
under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. A ban on cross-gender 
pat searches in female facilities reflects a societal movement to­
wards respecting a woman’s right to privacy, as seen by the number 
of states who voluntarily prohibit the practice.231  The very fact that 
so many states choose not to use cross-gender pat searches supports 
the viability of prohibiting them.  A prohibition on non-emergency 
cross-gender pat searches is in line with the stated goals of the 
Prison Rape Elimination Act, which is to reduce incidents of sexual 
assault to zero.232  When the numerous, drastic implications of 
cross-gender pat searches are weighed against the relatively mini­
mal potential effect on employment for male correctional staff, the 
better conclusion is that the only conclusion that can be reached is 
that cross-gender pat searches of female inmates should be 
prohibited. 
B. Women Working in Men’s Prisons 
When looking at prior legal precedent, male inmates do not 
have as persuasive an argument as their female counterparts.  Un­
like women, men have rarely succeeded in challenging cross-gender 
pat searches under either the Fourth or Eighth Amendments.233 
Courts claim that most male inmates do not object to cross-gender 
pat searches in order to undermine the privacy claims of those who 
the protected class of women employees,” so long as the restrictions on other, presuma­
bly male, employees is minimal). 
230. See infra Table 2, 3, & 4. 
231. See infra Table 1. 
232. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. R 
233. See Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1093 (8th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Fairman, 
678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982); Bagley v. Watson, 579 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Or. 1983). While a 
male inmate’s privacy rights were respected in Sterling v. Cupp, that case involved espe­
cially invasive pat searches, which involved anal and genital contact.  Sterling v. Cupp, 
625 P.2d 123, 131-32 (Or. 1981). The holding in Sterling was quickly undermined by 
Bagley v. Watson, which held that women’s Title VII rights take precedence over the 
inmates’ state constitutional rights because of the supremacy clause. Bagley, 579 F. 
Supp. at 1105. 
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do.234  In Smith v. Fairman, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that 
pat searches can “be . . . humiliating and degrading,” and cross-
gender pat searches only more so, but it still held that the humilia­
tion involved falls short of violating the Eighth Amendment.235 
The court in Timm v. Gunter, justified upholding cross-gender pat 
searches by citing the fact that women are trained to perform pat 
searches “professionally.”236  In so holding, the Eighth Circuit 
failed to acknowledge that often potential constitutional violations 
arise from the gender of the corrections officer itself, irrespective of 
whether the pat search is performed “professionally.” 
Statistics show, however, that cross-gender pat searches are 
often not performed professionally.237  There is a higher prevalence 
of allegations of abusive cross-gender sexual contact from female 
staff than their male counterparts.238  The purpose of the Prison 
Rape Elimination Act is to “protect incarcerated individuals from 
sexual abuse.”239  “In order to detect, prevent, reduce, and punish 
prison rape, and to protect inmates’ constitutional rights, the legal 
system must acknowledge that female staff can and do perpetrate 
sexual misconduct in prisons.”240  Furthermore, protecting male in­
mates from sexual assault is imperative, given the negative and 
long-lasting effects of staff sexual assault on not only the inmate, 
but on society as a whole.241  This rationale led the PREA Commis­
234. Timm, 917 F.2d at 1100 (“The District Court found that at [Nebraska State 
Penitentiary] most inmates do not reject opposite-sex pat searches with ‘great fre­
quency.’”); Bagley, 579 F. Supp. at 1104 (“The facts presented to this court show . . . 
that only a minority of male inmates suffer an invasion of their perceived personal 
privacy interests by the presence of female guards.”). 
235. Smith, 678 F.2d at 53. 
236. Timm, 917 F.2d at 1100. 
237. See supra notes 133-138. See generally Lauren A. Teichner, Unusual Sus- R 
pects:  Recognizing and Responding to Female Staff Perpetrators of Sexual Misconduct 
in U.S. Prisons, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 259, 288-94 (2008) (arguing that gender 
stereotypes portraying men as the sexual aggressors and women as passive participants 
have allowed women to “become ‘nearly invisible as sexual criminal[s]’ to the criminal 
justice system” (quoting Kay L. Levine, No Penis, No Problem, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 
357, 384 (2006) (alterations in original))). 
238. See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text. R 
239. See STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 118, at 1. R 
240. Teichner, supra note 237, at 297. R 
241. See PREA REPORT, supra note 10, at 44-48. R 
[F]ailure by lawmakers and the courts to adequately respond to staff sexual 
misconduct will have severe consequences for inmates and the prison system 
in general.  Allowing staff sexual misconduct to persist behind prison walls 
can, for instance, jeopardize prison security, create an environment lacking in 
“mutual respect” between staff and inmates, endanger the public health, and
 
violate inmates’ constitutional rights.
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sion to call for the cessation of cross-gender pat searches in non-
emergency situations for both male and female inmates.242 
Balanced against male inmates’ rights are the Title VII em­
ployment rights of female officers, analyzed in light of the history of 
discrimination found in the field of corrections.  “Reduction of the 
disparity in economic condition between men and women caused 
by the long history of discrimination against women has been recog­
nized as . . . an important governmental objective.”243 
Not only does the history of discrimination substantiate the 
need to allow women to work in male prisons, there is also the very 
real effect that a gender-based BFOQ would have on female cor­
rections officers throughout the country.  Unlike men, of whom 
only a very small percentage work in an all female institution, 74% 
of women employed as corrections officers by the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons (BOP) work in institutions entirely populated by male 
inmates.244  In a worst-case scenario, if no women are permitted to 
work in men’s prisons, 6,385 women would lose their jobs in the 
BOP alone.245 
Despite the potential employment consequences, a male in­
mates’ right to be free from sexual assault should take precedence 
over employment rights.  Congress recognized the importance of 
preventing sexual assault through implementation of a zero-toler­
ance policy in the Prison Rape Elimination Act.246  Being sexually 
assaulted “is simply ‘not part of the penalty that criminal offenders 
pay for their offenses against society.’”247  Because cross-gender 
pat searches increase the likelihood of sexual assault, their use is 
inherently inconsistent with a zero-tolerance policy. Therefore, 
cross-gender pat searches should not be performed on male inmates 
in a non-emergency situation. 
IV. SOLUTIONS 
The conclusion has been reached that both male and female 
inmates’ rights should take precedence; therefore, there should be a 
Teichner, supra note 237, at 297-98 (citations omitted). R 
242. Id. at 62-63. 
243. Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 962 (7th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977)). 
244. See infra Tables 2, 3 & 4. 
245. See infra Table 3. 
246. 42 U.S.C. § 15602 (2006). 
247. PREA REPORT, supra note 10, at 35 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 R 
(1994)). 
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nationwide prohibition on cross-gender pat searches. This conclu­
sion does not necessarily mean that employment rights should be 
disregarded.  The right of women to be free from employment dis­
crimination, allowing them to work in male prisons, has resulted 
from decades of continual effort.248  This effort has been directed 
not only towards overcoming legal hurdles, but also towards over­
coming gender-based stereotypes held by prisoners, co-workers, 
and supervisors.249  Employing women in male prisons benefits in­
mates as well as male co-workers.250  Women have been credited 
with having calming and normalizing effects on prisoners, encour­
aging practices such as non-confrontational problem solving, and 
causing an increase in overall diligence.251  Furthermore, an elimi­
nation of women in men’s prisons would lead to unemployment for 
approximately 7,000 women in the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
alone.252 
This Part looks at solutions found in the case law, analyzing 
whether the solution is appropriate in light of inmate and employee 
rights.  Initially, this section examines, and dismisses, the use of 
BFOQs to protect inmates’ rights from cross-gender pat searches. 
Then, this Note looks at the idea of compromise to accommodate 
both sets of rights, and in particular at a variety of practical solu­
tions that could be implemented to protect both inmates and cor­
rections officers’ rights.  No one solution will fully address the 
problem in every institution.  So long as potential solutions exist 
respecting both sets of rights prison administrators must attempt to 
implement corrective policies before subjugating employment 
rights to inmate privacy rights. 
A. The Bona-Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) 
Bona-fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs) are an excep­
tion to Title VII’s prohibition on discriminatory hiring practices.253 
BFOQs allow an employer to discriminate based on gender where 
gender is integral to job performance.254  BFOQs are meant to be 
248. See supra notes 141-153 and accompanying text. R 
249. See supra notes 187-190 and accompanying text. R 
250. See supra notes 190-196and accompanying text. R 
251. See supra notes 188, 192-196 and accompanying text. R 
252. See infra Tables 3 & 4. 
253. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. R 
254. Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 747-48 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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an extremely narrow exception, providing relief from Title VII in 
only the most compelling circumstances.255 
In order to ensure narrow interpretations for BFOQs, courts 
have created several formulations.  One formulation states that “an 
employer could rely on the BFOQ exception only by proving ‘that 
he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believ­
ing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform 
safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved.’”256 
To create a BFOQ, an employer must first show that it is rea­
sonably necessary to the operation of the business, rather than 
“merely reasonable or convenient.”257  To meet this standard, sub­
stantially all, if not all, members of the discriminated gender would 
need to be unable to perform the job so that making the determina­
tion on an individual basis would be either “impossible or highly 
impractical.”258  Furthermore, the determination that members of 
one sex would be unable to perform the job must have a factual 
basis; an employer may not rely on stereotypical differences or 
myths.259  A real difference between the sexes is one not based on 
“culturally induced proclivities.”260  To that end, an employer must 
ask “whether . . . the very womanhood or very manhood of the 
employee undermines his or her capacity to perform a job 
satisfactorily.”261 
“[I]n order to qualify as a BFOQ, a job qualification must re­
late to the essence, or to the central mission of the employer’s busi­
255. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333, 334 (1977); Everson, 391 F.3d at 
748; Torres v. Wisc. Dep’t of Health & Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1527 (7th Cir. 1988). 
Compelling circumstances are necessary to justify a BFOQ because 
employment discrimination . . . is “one of the most deplorable forms of dis­
crimination known to our society, for it deals with not just an individual’s shar­
ing in the ‘outer benefits’ of being an American citizen, but rather the ability 
to provide decently for one’s family in a job or profession for which he quali­
fies or chooses.” 
Id. at 1526-27 (quoting Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
256. Torres, 859 F.2d at 1527 (quoting  Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 
385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971)).  Another formulation states that “discrimination based on sex 
is valid only when the essence of the business operation would be undermined” by not 
hiring members of one sex exclusively. Id. (emphasis added). 
257. Everson, 391 F.3d at 748. 
258. Id. 
259. Torres, 859 F.2d at 1527. The Torres court noted, however, that “there are 
real as well as fictional differences between men and women.” Id. (citing City of Los 
Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
260. Id. at 1528 (quoting Torres v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
639 F. Supp. 271, 278 (E.D. Wis. 1986)). 
261. Id. 
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ness.”262  Furthermore, prisons must be examined individually to 
determine the necessities of the specific environment.263  Finally, 
the employer carries the heavy burden of establishing that there 
were no reasonable alternatives to the creation of a BFOQ.264 
Even where courts have been willing to recognize an inmate’s 
right to privacy, they have been hesitant to create a BFOQ.  In 
Forts v. Ward, the Second Circuit suggested that prisoner privacy 
rights may be sufficient to overcome the guards’ interest in equal 
job opportunities, but still refused to recognize a gender-based 
BFOQ for positions in female inmates’ sleeping chambers.265  The 
Second Circuit instead placed the onus on inmates to protect their 
own privacy by wearing one-piece pajamas (referred to by the dis­
trict court as “a two-legged bag”) which could be “uncomfortably 
warm.”266 
An exception has occurred where prison administrators have 
voluntarily instituted a BFOQ based on a reasonable determination 
that it is necessary to protect prisoner rights.267  Courts give deci­
sions of prison administrators deference, which allows them to deal 
with the myriad problems facing them on a daily basis.268  When the 
262. Everson, 391 F.3d at 749. 
263. Torres, 859 F.2d at 1529. 
264. Everson, 391 F.3d at 737, 749. 
265. Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1980). The court stated that they 
did “not minimize in any way the significance of the privacy interests of the inmates 
. . . . We do not elevate the employment rights of the guards above any protectible [sic] 
privacy rights of the inmates.” Id. 
266. Id.  “We seriously doubt that the inmates’ interests in style or even in avoid­
ing the occasional discomfort of warmth from a sleeping garment are of sufficient grav­
ity to justify denial of equal employment opportunities.” Id. 
267. See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1532-33 (upholding BFOQ created to promote “in­
mate rehabilitation and security”); Everson, 391 F.3d at 748-49 (holding that the em­
ployer in this case had established the BFOQ defense as well as listing the requirements 
that must be met in order to establish such a defense).  In Everson the Sixth Circuit 
upheld the creation of a BFOQ that had been implemented in response to several law­
suits resulting from sexual assault of inmates. Id. at 751, 759. 
268. See Everson, 391 F.3d at 750 (“Because of the unusual responsibilities en­
trusted to them, the redoubtable challenges they face, and the unique resources they 
possess, the decisions of prison administrators are entitled to a degree of deference, 
even in the Title VII context.”); Torres, 859 F.2d at 1529 (recognizing that “[u]nless 
prison administrators try new approaches, the ‘intractable problems’ will remain and 
the lot of the incarcerated individual will not improve”). The Sixth Circuit in Everson 
held that a substantial degree of deference is allowed where the decision is “the product 
of a reasoned decision making process, based on available information and experience.” 
Everson, 391 F.3d at 750 (quoting Torres, 859 F.2d at 1532) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  It justified this deference because prison administrators “must grapple with 
the ‘perplexing sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal 
function in the criminal justice system: to punish justly, to deter future crime and to 
605 
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BFOQ is supported by administrators it may be upheld even where 
the implicated prisoner rights do not rise to a constitutional level.269 
In order to prevent cross-gender pat searches a prison adminis­
trator may implement a gender-based BFOQ for all contact posi­
tions within the prison.270  Prohibiting as many as 25% of 
correctional staff in male prisons,271 and 56% in female prisons,272 
from performing pat searches would arguably undermine safety and 
security throughout.  In Smith v. Fairman, the Seventh Circuit 
stated that if a prison is going to be required to hire female officers, 
it must be allowed to utilize them to the fullest extent.273  Imagina­
bly, the converse is true as well, barring the ability to fully utilize 
female officers, a prison should be allowed not to hire them. 
Creating a gender-based BFOQ for contact positions involving 
performance of cross-gender pat searches is legally justifiable under 
the standard articulated in Dothard v. Rawlinson. Dothard re­
quires that the very womanhood (or manhood) of the officer under­
mine his or her ability to do the job.274  Many of the Constitutional 
claims arise from the incidence of the cross-gender pat search itself; 
they bear no relation to the ability of the corrections officer to per­
form the search professionally.275  Therefore, it is the very woman­
hood (or manhood) which interferes with performance of the job. 
return imprisoned persons to society with an improved chance of being useful law-abid­
ing citizens.’” Id. (quoting Torres, 859 F.2d at 1529).  In order to fulfill this role, a 
prison administrator must be allowed to “innovate and experiment” with new ap­
proaches. Id. (quoting Torres, 859 F.2d at 1529). 
269. Everson, 391 F.3d at 759 (“Regardless of whether its current conditions vio­
late the constitutional rights of its inmates, a prison may invoke the BFOQ defense to 
justify measures taken to enhance inmate privacy.” (emphasis added)). 
270. Opponents of prohibiting cross-gender pat searches urge that a BFOQ 
would be necessary, thereby directly pitting employment rights against the inmates’ 
rights. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1529 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting prison’s 
argument that cross-gender pat searches were necessary to avoid a discrimination-based 
lawsuit by the union); Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 962-63 (7th Cir. 1983) (uphold­
ing disparate treatment between male and female inmates based on legitimate peno­
logical interest in providing employment opportunities for women); Forde v. 
Zickefoose, 612 F. Supp. 2d 171, 178 (D. Conn. 2009) (stating that the court is sympa­
thetic to the prison’s Title VII concerns). 
271. See infra Table 4. 
272. See infra Table 2. 
273. Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 54 (7th Cir. 1982). 
274. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977). 
275. For example, the inmates in Jordan v. Gardner were susceptible to feelings 
of re-victimization solely because it was a man performing the pat search. See Jordan, 
986 F.2d at 1525.  The inmates’ feelings arose from their past experiences with men, not 
from the corrections officers themselves. Id. at 1525-26.  Similarly, in Forde v. Zick­
efoose, it was the gender (the manhood) of the officer that offended Forde’s religious 
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In women’s prisons, the creation of a BFOQ for contact posi­
tions may not be feasible as a practical matter. In the Federal Bu­
reau of Prisons, for instance, female officers comprise less than half 
of the current staff in womens’ correctional institutions.276  There­
fore, in the BOP, there is simply an insufficient number of female 
staff available to cover all contact positions.277  Without a BFOQ, 
female staff may be required to perform more pat searches, because 
male staff will no longer be performing them.  Staff disgruntlement, 
however, is neither a basis for violating inmates’ constitutional 
rights, nor is it a basis for employment discrimination.278 
In men’s prisons, the creation of a BFOQ for all contact posi­
tions, while potentially feasible, has a number of negative side ef­
fects.  Most clearly, there are approximately 7,000 women who 
would likely lose their job in the Federal BOP alone.279  Inmates 
and male staff would suffer as well because women have been 
beliefs, not a stereotypical perception of a man’s ability to professionally perform a pat 
search. See Forde, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 174. 
The DOJ’s proposed standard on cross-gender supervision would require that 
agencies train their staff to perform cross-gender pat searches professionally and re­
spectfully.  National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 76 
Fed. Reg. 6,248, 6,253 (proposed Feb. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt 115). 
Unfortunately, this standard fails to address any of the circumstances under which a 
cross-gender pat search can lead to a constitutional violation even where the search 
itself is done in a professional manner. 
276. See infra Table 2. 
277. See infra Table 2 (showing that women comprise only 43.6% of the staff at 
entirely female institutions).  The argument may be made that it is in light of the rela­
tively small number of female staff that cross-gender pat searches are necessary. This 
argument is undermined, however, by the fact that so many states have already limited 
cross-gender pat searches to emergencies. See infra Table 1. 
278. Nor should staff disgruntlement entitle prison administrators to disregard 
employment rights. 
“Minor adjustments of staff schedules and job responsibilities do not consti­
tute the type of administrative burden that justifies overriding constitutional 
rights. . . . The adjustments pointed to by the prison officials [that barring male 
guards from conducting suspicionless searches would require some adjust­
ments of staff schedules and job responsibilities] are de minimis indeed.” 
Forde v. Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170, 181 (D. Conn. 2010) (quoting Jordan, 986 F.2d at 
1539 (Reinhardt, J., concurring)); see infra notes 296-299 and accompanying text. R 
279. See infra Tables 3 & 4.  During a study to determine the costs associated with 
implementing the PREA Commission standards, the departments of correction in both 
Indiana and Massachusetts claimed that ending cross-gender pat searches would force 
them to lay off female staff. See BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, supra note 118, at 15.  Indi- R 
ana claimed it would need to eliminate 639 female officers at a one-time cost of 
$14,985,000. Id.  Massachusetts claimed it would need to eliminate 69 female officers at 
a cost of $1,8974,000. Id.  Based on the study it is unclear whether these positions 
assume implementation of a BFOQ or whether they would be necessary given one of 
the suggested solutions below. 
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found to have a number of positive effects both for the inmates and 
for their fellow co-workers.280  Since men already comprise greater 
than 75% of the staff in the all male prisons within the BOP,281 
exempting the remaining 25% from performance of pat searches 
would not impose the same level of administrative difficulty seen in 
female prisons.  While the male staff may be required to perform 
additional pat searches, because women would no longer be per­
forming them, appeasing staff is not a justifiable basis for employ­
ment discrimination.282 
Furthermore, as argued below, the conflict is not one between 
inmates’ rights and employment but rather is one between employ­
ment rights and administrative convenience.283  If a prison can suc­
cessfully implement an alternative solution, even an 
administratively inconvenient one, it must.  Employment rights may 
not be subjugated to administrative convenience.284 
Given the stringent guidelines necessary to qualify for the nar­
row BFOQ exception to Title VII, the practical reasons against us­
ing a BFOQ, and that other solutions are available, a BFOQ is not 
the appropriate solution to end cross-gender pat searches. 
B.	 The Role of Compromise in Weighing Inmate and Employee 
Rights 
While courts have recognized that inmates’ privacy rights and 
correction officers’ employment rights can come into conflict,285 
they often require a prison system to demonstrate an inability to 
reconcile these rights before subjugating one to the other.286 
280.	 See supra notes 192-196. R 
281.	 See infra Table 4. 
282.	 See supra note 278. R 
283.	 See infra notes 296-297 and accompanying text. R 
284.	 See infra notes 296-297 and accompanying text. R 
285. See supra note 4; Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 55 (7th Cir. 1982) (“While R 
recognizing the right of one sex not to be discriminated against in job opportunities 
within the prison because of their gender, [other courts] have also concluded that in­
mates do have some right to avoid unwanted intrusions by persons of the opposite 
sex.”); Berl v. County of Westchester, 84 Civ. 8505, 1986 WL 746, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 
1986) (“However, on the facts before me equal job opportunity must in some measure 
give way to the right of privacy.” (emphasis added)). 
286. See Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1372 n.21 (11th Cir. 1982) (“A 
number of courts have recognized the possibility of avoiding a clash between privacy 
and employment rights by use of selective job assignments.”); Smith, 678 F.2d at 55 
(“The resulting conflict between these two interests has normally been resolved by at­
tempting to accommodate both interests through adjustments in scheduling and job 
responsibilities for the guards.”); Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1212 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(“Resolution of such cases requires a careful inquiry as to whether the competing inter­
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In Edwards v. Department of Corrections, an Alabama Federal 
District Court analyzed the ability of the Department of Correc­
tions (DOC) to compromise between privacy rights and employ­
ment rights relating to the performance of, among other things, 
cross-gender pat searches.287  The DOC denied Officer Edwards a 
permanent position as shift commander at the Julia Tutwiler Prison 
for Women, asserting that the position had a female gender-based 
BFOQ despite the fact that Officer Edwards had temporarily held 
the position at the Tutwiler prison twice before, for a total of eleven 
months.288 
The Department asserted that Edwards could not perform the 
job because, while his principle duty would be to supervise other 
corrections officers, he could be called upon to physically search 
inmates.289  Edwards was able to provide evidence, however, that 
he “rarely if ever had to search female inmates while serving as 
acting shift commander.”290  Instead of searching inmates himself, 
“he was able to summon a female officer to perform” the search.291 
Because the Department failed to provide evidence “that the 
nature of the prison’s operation preclude[d] rearranging job respon­
sibilities in a way that would eliminate the clash between the pri­
vacy interests of inmates and the employment opportunities of 
ests can be satisfactorily accommodated before deciding whether one interest must be 
vindicated to the detriment of the other.”); Forde v. Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170, 179-80 
(D. Conn. 2010). 
287. Edwards v. Dep’t of Corr., 615 F. Supp. 804, 808 (M.D. Ala. 1985). 
288. Id. at 808-09.  Edwards had not been the only man to hold this position, a 
prior male officer had acted as shift supervisor. Id. at 809. 
289. Id.  The Department also asserted that, even without the discriminatory pol­
icy, Edwards would not have been chosen for promotion. Id. at 807.  Had the Depart­
ment been able to prove that was the case Edwards would not have been able to show 
an adverse employment decision resulting from gender. Id. at 806. 
The requirement that a discriminatory practice result in an adverse employment 
decision seems minor, but has made a difference in several prison Title VII cases. See 
Tharp v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 68 F.3d 223, 225 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding a policy where 
only female Residential Advisors are assigned to the women’s unit because it was a 
“minimal restriction that did not deprive plaintiffs of employment opportunities or oth­
erwise adversely affect their employment status” (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Tipler v. Douglas County, No. 8:04CV470, 2006 WL 1314328, at *13 
(D. Neb. May 11, 2006) (upholding a gender-based shift change because while undesir­
able and inconvenient for the plaintiff, it did “not constitute an adverse employment 
action”). 
290. Edwards, 615 F. Supp. at 809. 
291. Id.  The male officer who had previously held the position had not searched 
inmates either. Id. 
609 
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officers as shift commanders,” they violated Title VII by refusing to 
promote Edwards based on his gender.292 
Similarly, in Gunther v. Iowa State Men’s Reformatory, a dis­
trict court in Iowa held that a prison had to compromise job respon­
sibilities to protect employment rights.293  Ms. Gunther applied for 
a position as a Correction Officer Level II (COII), which she was 
denied on the basis of gender.294  Iowa asserted that the COII posi­
tion required contact with inmates, which was not feasible for a wo­
man on a number of grounds, including inmate privacy rights.295 
The court, rather than interpreting this as a conflict between 
inmate privacy rights and employment rights, interpreted the issue 
as a conflict between administrative convenience and employment 
rights.296  It was within the power of the prison to adjust the COII 
responsibilities for Ms. Gunther to include only those that would 
not implicate other concerns, such as inmate privacy concerns.297 
The government responded that to adjust assignments for women 
COII positions “would be economically and administratively un­
sound and unfair to male co-workers who perform the gamut of 
COII duties.”298  The court held, however, that “[n]one of these 
reasons, alone or aggregated, is grounds for denying women their 
right not to be discriminated against in employment 
opportunity.”299 
292. Id. at 810. 
293. Gunther v. Iowa State Men’s Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952, 958 (N.D. Iowa 
1979). 
294. Id. at 954. 
295. Id. at 955.  The prison stated “women in contact positions . . . would: (1) 
violate prisoners’ privacy rights; (2) jeopardize prison security and rehabilitative pro­
grams; (3) put the guards, both male and female, in increased danger; and (4) lead to 
major disciplinary problems.” Id.  The prison also asserted that “fashioning a rotation 
to avoid placing them in dangerous areas or in areas where inmate privacy must be 
maintained would be unfair to male officers and would create serious administrative 
problems.” Id. 
296. Id. at 957.  In response to the government’s claim that its concern was for 
inmate privacy rights, the court stated that “[p]rivacy is certainly to be respected but the 
essence of the facility is not a function of having all personnel available to work in all 
areas.” Id. 
297. Id.  “Any inconvenience in scheduling cannot outweigh plaintiff’s rights.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
298. Id. 
299. Id. 
[I]f complaints of fellow workers were grounds for a [BFOQ], Title VII could 
be gutted by the gripes of entrenched employees.  Clearly job assignment ad­
justments within the facility in the past have not undermined its essential goals 
or functions.  While there may be a valid reason to limit certain of the func­
tions of female correction officers, there is no legal reason to cut them off 
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There are several practical solutions that may be implemented, 
short of a BFOQ, which protect both inmates’ rights to be free from 
cross-gender pat searches and employment rights. While none of 
these solutions is guaranteed to work in every institution, the avail­
ability of several potential solutions demonstrates the feasibility im­
plementing processes that protect both sets of rights. When 
weighing the feasibility of any given solution, an administrator 
should remember that administrative inconveniences do not excuse 
the violation of either employment or inmate rights.300 
1. Gender Specific Tasks301 
The first solution is to make performance of a pat search a gen­
der specific task.  Rather than requiring all corrections staff in a 
certain position to do pat searches, a prison may make the perform­
ance of pat searches specific to the gender of the prisoner.  Many 
prisons, even those that currently allow cross-gender pat searches, 
already use gender-specific tasks for performance of strip 
searches.302  Under this solution, performance of pat searches is not 
related to a specific job and thus should not be a bar to promo­
tion.303  Therefore, a prison can ensure that neither men nor women 
are discriminated against in job opportunities. 
completely from COII classification and the opportunities that classification 
offers. 
Id. In regards to prison concerns relating to scheduling the court stated that 
“[b]alancing the federal right not to be discriminated against in employment against the 
administrative inconvenience of functional scheduling dictates institutional adjustments 
which will not substantially affect the efficient operation of the facility or undermine its 
essential functions.  Administrative inconvenience cannot justify discrimination.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
300. Id. at 957. 
301. Cases that suggest the use of gender-specific tasks include Edwards v. Dep’t 
of Corr., 615 F. Supp. 804, 809 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (striking BFOQ for shift commander 
position because plaintiff could summon a female officer to perform pat searches); 
Gunther, 462 F. Supp. at 957 (referencing the “substantial number of jobs within the 
facility that can be performed by a qualified female COII”). 
302. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  JUSTICE  FEDERAL  BUREAU OF  PRISONS, PROGRAM 
STATEMENT  NUMBER 5521.05, SEARCHES OF  HOUSING  UNITS, INMATES, AND  INMATE 
WORK AREAS § 552.11, at 3 (1997) (“Staff of the same sex as the inmate shall make the 
search, except where circumstances are such that delay would mean the likely loss of 
contraband.”); see Forde v. Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170, 179 (D.Conn. 2010) (“[T]he fact 
that [FCI Danbury] already prohibits routine visual searches by male staff suggests that 
gender-based staff movements is eminently possible.”). 
303. Warden Donna Zickefoose testified that any member of the staff at FCI 
Danbury can perform a pat search.  Transcript of Bench Trial Volume 2 at 171, Forde v. 
Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170 (D. Conn. 2010) (No. 3:03CV1424).  While any staff member 
can perform the search, they are most often done by corrections officers. Id. 
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While easy to explain, this solution does impose potential ad­
ministrative difficulties.  At FCI Danbury, a federal female institu­
tion, only one-third of corrections staff are women.304  As a result, 
two-thirds of the staff would not be able to perform what is gener­
ally recognized as an essential component of prison security.305 
This hurdle is not, however, insurmountable. To the extent that 
there are certain areas or times within a prison where pat searches 
are more likely to occur,306 it is easy for prison administrators to 
ensure that there is a woman stationed nearby to accommodate that 
need.  This solution would require female staff to perform more pat 
searches than they currently do; the complaints of staff, however, 
do not justify violation of constitutional rights.307 
2. Gender Conscious Scheduling 
A related solution involves gender-conscious scheduling. 
Under this solution, the schedule would be modified to ensure that 
a certain number of women (or men) were working within the 
prison during each shift.  The schedule would not assign specific po­
sitions based on gender.  Nor would the scheduling be based on 
gender alone, so long as sufficient female (or male) staff were as­
signed to each shift.  For many BOP male institutions this should 
not be a problem because 75% of the staff is the same gender as the 
inmates.308 
The potential does arise for an employee subject to gender-
conscious scheduling to bring a discrimination suit.  In Tipler v. 
Douglas County, an officer brought a claim based on being moved 
to a less desirable shift as a result of her gender.309  The district 
court in Nebraska dismissed her claim, holding that a change in 
shift, while undesirable and inconvenient, did not constitute an “ad­
verse employment action.”310  Without an adverse employment de­
304. See infra Table 2. 
305. See infra Table 2; Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 1990). 
306. The District Court of Connecticut in Forde v. Baird noted that “like visual 
searches, the vast majority of pat searches occur at predictable times and places,” thus 
making it “especially puzzling” that FCI Danbury would assert that accommodating 
Forde’s religious right to same-sex pat searches would implicate staffing issues. Forde, 
720 F. Supp. 2d at 181. 
307. Gunther v. Iowa State Men’s Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952, 957 (N.D. Iowa 
1979). 
308. See infra Table 4. 
309. Tipler v. Douglas County, No. 8:04CV470, 2006 WL 1314328, at *1 (D. Neb. 
May 11, 2006). 
310. Id. at *13. 
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cision, there had been no violation of Title VII; her employment 
rights had not been violated.311 
Prison administrators can minimize the amount of gender-con­
scious scheduling necessary by providing their staff with radios or 
some other communication device.312  Then, if a female officer is 
available anywhere on the compound she can be contacted quickly 
to come and perform the pat search.313  This strategy should be fea­
sible, given that there is no Federal prison where same-gender staff 
constitutes less than 30% of the total staff.314 
3. Same-Gender Rover Positions 
Prison administrators may have a legitimate concern that call­
ing for a same-gender officer for performance of a pat search may 
weaken security.  The officers called for would need to choose be­
tween finding a replacement for their own post before attending to 
the pat search and leaving the post unoccupied. While the officer 
tries to find a replacement, someone would need to watch the in­
mate selected for the pat search and would therefore also be unable 
to continue performing his or her job responsibilities.  “[T]he preci­
sion operation of a prison facility does not allow for such on-the-fly 
staffing adjustments.”315  To address this concern, the institutions 
could hire one or two additional officers per shift whose job it is to 
perform pat searches. 
This solution has several potential problems. First, these posi­
tions would need to be gender-based BFOQs to ensure that the of­
ficers assigned would be able to perform same-sex pat searches.  It 
stands to reason, however, that one or two gender specific posts per 
311. Id.; see also Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (“At trial, 
the prison officials’ own witnesses testified that not a single bid had been refused, pro­
motion denied, nor guard replaced as a result of the ban on routine cross-gender 
clothed body searches.”); Forde, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 181 (“[G]ender-based assignment of 
shifts, even where it prevents correctional officers from selecting preferred assignments, 
is a ‘minimal restriction’ that can be tolerated.” (citations omitted)). 
312. Edda Cantor, a correctional expert offered by the government in the Forde 
v. Baird case, testified that she had observed that most of the staff at FCI Danbury 
carried radios, and that, in fact, female staff could be summoned to perform strip 
searches via radio.  Transcript of Bench Trial Volume 2 at 76-77, Forde v. Baird, 720 F. 
Supp. 2d 170 (D. Conn. 2010) (No. 3:03CV1424). 
313. “Forde presented expert testimony that, in many circumstances, the sum­
moning of a female correctional officer to conduct a pat search in a non-emergency 
situation could involve nothing more than an immaterial minute or two delay.” Forde, 
720 F. Supp. 2d at 174. 
314. See infra Table 2. 
315. Forde, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 174. 
 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE211.txt unknown Seq: 47 27-SEP-11 10:25 
2011] CROSS-GENDER PAT SEARCHES 613 
shift are preferable to a blanket rule requiring all contact positions 
to be same-gender.  Furthermore, the feasibility of such assign­
ments is apparent in that the Federal Bureau of Prisons already 
does not allow cross-gender strip searches,316 searches which occur 
in specific locations and thus require that the staff assigned to those 
locations be same-gender. 
Second, these additional positions may be expensive. The Mis­
souri Department of Corrections estimated additional annual costs 
of over $18.3 million to “provide three additional posts per institu­
tion and supervision to provide on-call same gender pat search ca­
pability.”317  To limit additional costs, institutions could make the 
decision to have these additional officers only on during those pre­
dictable times when pat searches are more likely to occur.  Beyond 
that, many facilities will already have rover positions, therefore the 
institution would not need to hire new staff—rather it would merely 
need to change a few existing positions to BFOQs. 
4. Allow Inmates to Request Same-Gender Pat Searches318 
The final solution, while not ideal, reflects both a concern for 
the potentially significant adverse employment effects against wo­
men working in male prisons, and the fact that most male inmates 
do not object to cross-gender pat searches.319  Prison administrators 
would provide each inmate the opportunity to request same-sex pat 
searches; if an inmate requests a same-sex pat search, the prison 
would accommodate that request, designating the inmate as subject 
only to same-sex pat searches through application of a sticker to the 
inmate’s ID.320 
316. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  JUSTICE  FEDERAL  BUREAU OF  PRISONS, PRO­
GRAM STATEMENT NUMBER 5521.05, SEARCHES OF HOUSING UNITS, INMATES, AND IN­
MATE  WORK  AREAS § 552.11(b)(2), at 2-3 (1997) (requiring that staff of the same 
gender perform a visual search; defined as a search of “all body surfaces and body 
cavities”). 
317. See BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, supra note 118, at 15. R 
318. A similar approach was suggested in Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F. Supp. 2d 
171, 183 (D. Conn. 2009).  Ms. Forde had requested an individual exemption from 
cross-gender pat searches in relation to her Muslim faith. Id. at 175-76.  Another 
inmate at FCI Danbury had already been given an individual exemption “with little or 
no impact on employment.” Id. at 181. 
319. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. R 
320. New York marks identification cards with the letters “CGPFE” to indicate 
when a female inmate has been given a cross-gender pat search (frisk) exemption. 
STATE OF  NEW  YORK  DEPARTMENT OF  CORRECTIONAL  SERVICES, DIRECTIVE  NO. 
4910, CONTROL OF & SEARCH FOR CONTRABAND, § III(B)(3)(b)(2), at 3 (2001).  If an 
inmate has an exemption, a male officer may not search her in non-emergency circum­
stances. Id. 
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Allowing an inmate to opt out of cross-gender pat searches 
protects an inmate’s constitutional rights, regardless of whether 
those rights originate from religion, privacy and dignity, or feelings 
of re-victimization.  Unfortunately, this solution provides only lim­
ited protection for inmates who are, in the course of a pat search, 
subjected to sexual assault.  An inmate who alleged sexual assault 
would be able to opt out of future cross-gender pat searches. This 
solution is not ideal because, as recognized by PREA, there should 
be a zero-tolerance policy towards sexual assault; the occurrence of 
even one assault is too many. 
Furthermore, the ability to opt out of cross-gender pat searches 
places a certain amount of autonomy with the inmate, an autonomy 
which would not be implicated by a policy either allowing or disal­
lowing cross-gender pat searches for all inmates.  An inmate would 
be able to opt out of cross-gender pat searches where performance 
of a cross-gender pat search would not violate any constitutional 
right—in other words, he or she might abuse the process to exercise 
control over his or her environment.321  If, however, the other op­
tion would be to create a BFOQ and thereby discriminate in em­
ployment based on gender, the risk of inmate autonomy on this one 
issue does not seem as grave. 
CONCLUSION 
Pat searches are an essential component of prison security, 
helping to control the flow of contraband within the prison.322 
Cross-gender pat searches, however, expose inmates to the poten­
tial violation of a number of constitutionally protected rights, in­
cluding those under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Other rights may also be violated, including rights 
found in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 
as well as rights guaranteed by individual state constitutions.  Cross-
gender pat searches also expose inmates to heightened risk of sex­
ual assault by corrections staff.  Sexual assault, in turn, affects more 
than just the prisoner; it can undermine prison security as a whole. 
321. While not directly addressed in this Note, allowing inmate autonomy in de­
termining whether or not to request a same-sex pat search may also be beneficial in 
instances involving transgender inmates. See MURRAY D. SCHEEL & CLAIRE EUSTACE, 
MODEL  PROTOCALS ON THE  TREATMENT OF  TRANSGENDER  PERSONS BY  SAN  FRAN­
CISCO COUNTY JAIL I(c), at 4 (2002) (suggesting that “[a]ll searches of the transgender 
inmate’s person will be done by two officers of the gender requested by the transgender 
inmate”), available at www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/sfprisonguidelines.doc. 
322. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. R 
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Because of these problems, the use of non-emergency cross-
gender pat searches must be abolished. The Prison Rape Elimina­
tion Act Commission and the American Bar Association have both 
already reached this conclusion.323  That does not mean, however, 
that employment rights should be disregarded. While opponents of 
prohibiting cross-gender pat searches claim that the inevitable re­
sult is a high cost in terms of women’s employment opportuni­
ties,324 that is not in fact the case. There are a number of practical 
solutions that may be implemented by prisons to protect employ­
ment rights without performing cross-gender pat searches.  Solu­
tions include creation of gender-specific tasks, using gender-
conscious scheduling, or allowing inmates to opt out of cross-gender 
pat searches, thus protecting their own constitutional rights. While 
administratively inconvenient, these solutions must be pursued 
prior to engaging in employment discrimination.  By pursuing a 
practical solution other than a BFOQ, both inmate and employ­
ment rights can be protected. 
Robyn Gallagher* 
323. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text. R 
324. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. R 
* J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2011; Senior Articles 
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TABLE 1
 
RESULTS OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL SURVEY ON CROSS­
GENDER PAT SEARCHES ON FEMALE INMATES STATE PAT­
DOWN PRACTICES
 
Allow Cross-Gender 
State Pat Searches Comments 
Alabama Yes limit occurrence 
Alaska Yes emergency only 
Arizona Yes emergency only 
Arkansas Yes emergency only 
California Yes generally allowed 
Colorado Yes emergency only*** 
Connecticut Yes generally allowed 
Delaware Yes emergency only 
Florida Yes emergency only 
Georgia Yes limit occurrence 
Hawaii Yes limit occurrence 
Idaho Yes emergency only*** 
Illinois Yes emergency only 
Indiana Yes generally allowed 
Iowa Yes limit occurrence 
Kansas Yes generally allowed 
Maine Yes emergency only 
Massachusetts Yes emergency only 
Michigan Yes emergency only 
Minnesota No Prohibited! 
Mississippi Yes emergency only 
Missouri Yes limit occurrence 
Montana Yes emergency only 
Nebraska Yes generally allowed 
Nevada Yes emergency only 
New Hampshire Yes emergency only 
New Jersey Yes generally allowed 
New Mexico No Prohibited! 
New York Yes limit occurrence 
North Carolina Yes generally allowed 
North Dakota Yes generally allowed 
Ohio Yes generally allowed 
Oklahoma Yes emergency only 
Oregon Yes emergency only*** 
Pennsylvania Yes generally allowed 
Rhode Island Yes emergency only 
South Carolina Yes limit occurrence 
617 
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Allow Cross-Gender 
State Pat Searches Comments 
South Dakota No Prohibited! 
Tennessee Yes limit occurrence 
Texas Yes emergency only 
Utah Yes emergency only*** 
Vermont Yes emergency only*** 
Virginia Yes emergency only*** 
Washington Yes emergency only*** 
Washington, DC No Prohibited! 
West Virginia Yes emergency only 
Wisconsin Yes emergency only 
Wyoming Yes generally allowed 
*** These states were not included in the Amnesty International Article, 
statistics were instead obtained from Sandra Norman-Eady & George 
Coppolo, Cross-Gender Body Searches in Correctional Institutions (Mar. 
12, 2001), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2001/rpt/2001-r-0321.htm. 
Amnesty International, Abuse of Women in Custody: Sexual Misconduct 
and Shackling of Pregnant Women, Policies, Procedures and Practices of 
Guarding Women (2006), http://www.amnestyusa.org/violence-against­
women/abuse-of-women-in-custody/key-findings-policies-procedures-and­
practices-of-guarding-women/page.do?id=1108299 (last visited Jan. 23, 
2011). 
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